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ABSTRACT
As the rollout of secure route origin authentication with the
RPKI slowly gains traction among network operators, there
is a push to standardize secure path validation for BGP (i.e.,
S*BGP: S-BGP, soBGP, BGPSEC, etc.). Origin authentica-
tion already does much to improve routing security. More-
over, the transition to S*BGP is expected to be long and
slow, with S*BGP coexisting in “partial deployment” along-
side BGP for a long time. We therefore use theoretical and
experimental approach to study the security benefits pro-
vided by partially-deployed S*BGP, vis-a-vis those already
provided by origin authentication. Because routing policies
have a profound impact on routing security, we use a survey
of 100 network operators to find the policies that are likely to
be most popular during partial S*BGP deployment. We find
that S*BGP provides only meagre benefits over origin au-
thentication when these popular policies are used. We also
study the security benefits of other routing policies, pro-
vide prescriptive guidelines for partially-deployed S*BGP,
and show how interactions between S*BGP and BGP can
introduce new vulnerabilities into the routing system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.2 [Computer-
Communication Networks]: Network Protocols
Keywords: security; routing; BGP;
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent high-profile routing failures [9,14,42,43] have high-
lighted major vulnerabilities in BGP, the Internet’s interdo-
main routing protocol. To remedy this, secure origin authen-
tication [10, 38, 40] using the RPKI [34] is gaining traction
among network operators, and there is now a push to stan-
dardize a path validation protocol (i.e., S*BGP [28,33,49]).
Origin authentication is relatively lightweight, requiring nei-
ther changes to the BGP message structure nor online cryp-
tographic computations. Meanwhile, path validation with
S*BGP could require both [33]. The deployment of origin
authentication is already a significant challenge [2]; here we
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ask, is the deployment of S*BGP path validation worth the
extra effort? (That is, is the juice worth the squeeze?)
To answer this question, we must contend with the fact
that any deployment of S*BGP is likely to coexist with
legacy insecure BGP for a long time. (IPv6 and DNSSEC,
for example, have been in deployment since at least 1999 and
2007 respectively.) In a realistic partial deployment scenario,
an autonomous system (AS) that has deployed S*BGP will
sometimes need to accept insecure routes sent via legacy
BGP; otherwise, it would lose connectivity to the parts of
the Internet that have not yet deployed S*BGP [33]. Most
prior research has ignored this issue, either by assuming that
ASes will never accept insecure routes [6, 11], by studying
only the full deployment scenario where every AS has al-
ready deployed S*BGP [10, 22], or by focusing on creating
incentives for ASes to adopt S*BGP in the first place [11,19].
We consider the security benefits provided by partially-
deployed S*BGP vis-a-vis those already provided by ori-
gin authentication. Fully-deployed origin authentication is
lightweight and already does much to improve security, even
against attacks it was not designed to prevent (e.g., prop-
agation of bogus AS-level paths) [22]. We find that, given
the routing policies that are likely to be most popular dur-
ing partial deployment, S*BGP can provide only meagre
improvements to security over what is already possible with
origin authentication; we find that other, less popular poli-
cies can sometimes provide tangible security improvements.
(“Popular” routing policies were found using a survey of 100
network operators [18].) However, we also show that secu-
rity improvements can come at a risk; complex interactions
between BGP and S*BGP can introduce new instabilities
and vulnerabilities into the routing system.
1.1 Security with partially-deployed S*BGP.
With BGP, an AS learns AS-level paths to destination
ASes (and their IP prefixes) via routing announcements from
neighboring ASes; it then selects one path per destination
by applying its local routing policies. Origin authentication
ensures that the destination AS that announces a given IP
prefix is really authorized to do so. S*BGP ensures that the
AS-level paths learned actually exist in the network.
In S*BGP partial deployment, security will be profoundly
affected by the routing policies used by individual ASes, the
AS-level topology, and the set of ASes that are secure (i.e.,
have deployed S*BGP). Suppose a secure AS has a choice
between a secure route (learned via S*BGP) and an inse-
cure route (learned via legacy BGP) to the same destina-
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tion. While it seems natural that the AS should always
prefer the secure route over the insecure route, a network
operator must balance security against economic and per-
formance concerns. As such, a long secure route through a
costly provider might be less desirable than a short insecure
route through a revenue-generating customer. Indeed, the
BGPSEC standard is careful to provide maximum flexibil-
ity, stating the relationship between an AS’s routing policies
and the security of a route “is a matter of local policy” [33].
While this flexibility is a prerequisite for assuring opera-
tors that S*BGP will not disrupt existing traffic engineering
or network management polices 1, it can have dire conse-
quences on security. Attackers can exploit routing policies
that prioritize economic and/or length considerations above
security. In a protocol downgrade attack, for example, an
attacker convinces a secure AS with a secure route to down-
grade to a bogus route sent via legacy BGP, simply because
the bogus route is shorter, or less costly (Section 3.2).
1.2 Methodology & paper roadmap.
Three routing models. In Section 2 we develop models
for routing with partially-deployed S*BGP, based on classic
models of AS business relationships and BGP [16,17,24–26].
Our security 1st model supposes that secure ASes always
prefer secure routes over insecure ones; while this is most
natural from a security perspective, a survey of 100 network
operators [18] suggests that it is least popular in partial
deployment. In our security 2nd model, a secure route is
preferred only if no less-costly insecure route is available.
The survey confirms that our security 3rd model is most
popular in partial deployment [18]; here a secure route is
preferred only if there is no shorter or less-costly insecure
route. In Appendix K we analyze the robustness of our
results to assumptions made in these models.
Threat model & metric. Sections 3-4.1 introduce our
threat model, and a metric to quantify security within this
threat model; our metric measures the average fraction of
ASes using a legitimate route when a destination is attacked.
Deployment invariants. The vast number of choices for
the set S of ASes that adopt S*BGP makes evaluating secu-
rity challenging. Section 4 therefore presents our (arguably)
most novel methodological contribution; a framework that
bounds the maximum improvements in security possible for
each routing model, for any deployment scenario S.
Deployment scenarios. How close do real S*BGP de-
ployments S come to these bounds? While a natural objec-
tive would be to determine the “optimal” deployment S, we
prove that this is NP-hard. Instead, Sections 5-6 use simu-
lations on empirical AS-level graphs to quantify security in
scenarios suggested in the literature [6,11,19,44], and deter-
mine root causes for security improvements (or lack thereof).
Algorithms & experimental robustness. We de-
signed parallel simulation algorithms to deal with the large
space of parameters that we explore, i.e., attackers, desti-
nations, deployment scenarios S, and routing policies, (Ap-
pendix B and H). We also controlled for empirical pitfalls,
including (a) variations in routing policies (Appendix K) (b)
the fact that empirical AS-level graphs tend to miss many
1Practitioners commonly resist deployment of a new proto-
col because it “breaks” their networks; witness the zone enu-
meration issue in DNSSEC [32] or the fact that IPv6 is some-
times disabled because it degrades DNS performance [50].
peering links at Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) [3, 5, 45],
(Section 2.2, Appendix J) (c) a large fraction of the Inter-
net’s traffic originates at a few ASes [31] (Sections 2.2, 4.5, 5.2.2, 5.3.1).
While our analysis cannot predict exactly how individual
ASes would react to routing attacks, we do report on strong
aggregate trends.
Proofs. Proofs of our theorems are in Appendix B-I.
1.3 Results.
Our simulations, empirically-validated examples, and the-
oretical analyses indicate the following:
Downgrades are a harsh reality. We find that proto-
col downgrade attacks (Sections 1.1, 3.2) can be extremely
effective; so effective, in fact, that they render deployments
of S*BGP at large Tier 1 ISPs almost useless in the face of
attacks (Sections 4.6 and 5.3.1).
New vulnerabilities. We find that the interplay be-
tween topology and routing policies can cause some ASes
to fall victim to attacks they would have avoided if S*BGP
had not been deployed. Fortunately, these troubling phe-
nomena occur less frequently than phenomena that protect
ASes from attacks during partial deployment (Section 6).
New instabilities. We show that undesirable phenomena
(BGP Wedgies [23]) can occur if ASes prioritize security
inconsistently (Section 2.3).
Prescriptive deployment guidelines. Other than sug-
gesting that (1) ASes should prioritize security in the same
way in order to avoid routing instabilities, our results (2)
confirm that deploying lightweight simplex S*BGP [19, 33]
(instead of full-fledged S*BGP) at stub ASes at the edge of
the Internet does not harm security (Section 5.3.2). More-
over, while [6, 11, 19] suggest that Tier 1s should be early
adopters of S*BGP, our results do not support this; instead,
we suggest that (3) Tier 2 ISPs should be among the earliest
adopters of S*BGP (Section 4.6, 5.2.3, 5.3.1).
Is the juice worth the squeeze? We use our met-
ric to compare S*BGP in a partial deployment S to the
baseline scenario where no AS is secure (i.e., S = ∅ and
only origin authentication is in place). We find that large
partial deployments of S*BGP provide excellent protection
against attacks when ASes use routing policies that priori-
tize security 1st (Section 5.2.3); however, [18] suggests that
network operators are less likely to use these routing poli-
cies. Meanwhile, the policies that operators most favor (i.e.,
security 3rd) provide only meagre improvements over origin
authentication (Section 4.4). This is not very surprising,
since S*BGP is designed to prevent path-shortening attacks
and when security is 3rd, ASes prefer (possibly-bogus) short
insecure routes over longer secure routes.
However, it is less clear what happens in security is 2nd,
where route security is prioritized over route length. Un-
fortunately, even when S*BGP is deployed at 50% of ASes,
the benefits obtained in the security 2nd model lag signif-
icantly behind those available when security is 1st. While
some destinations can obtain tangible benefits when security
is 2nd, for others (especially Tier 1s) the security 2nd model
behaves much like the security 3rd model (Section 5.2). We
could only find clear-cut evidence of strong overall improve-
ment in security when ASes prioritize security 1st.
Tier 1 13 ASes with high customer degree & no providers
Tier 2 100 top ASes by customer degree & with providers
Tier 3 Next 100 ASes by customer degree & with providers
CPs 17 Content provider ASes listed in Figure 13
Small CPs Top 300 ASes by peering degree
(other than Tier 1, 2, 3, and CP)
Stubs-x ASes with peers but no customers
Stubs ASes with no customers & no peers
SMDG Remaining non-stub ASes
Table 1: Tiers.
2. SECURITY & ROUTING POLICIES
S*BGP allows an AS to validate the correctness of the
AS-level path information it learns from its neighbors [10].
(S-BGP [28] and BGPSEC [33] validate that every AS on a
path sent a routing announcement for that path; soBGP [49]
validates that all the edges in a path announcement physi-
cally exist in the AS-level topology. As we shall see in Sec-
tion 3, our analysis applies to all these protocols.) However,
for S*BGP to prevent routing attacks, validation of paths
alone is not sufficient. ASes also need to use information
from path validation to make their routing decisions. We
consider three alternatives for incorporating path validation
into routing decisions, and analyze the security of each.
2.1 Dilemma: Where to place security?
An AS that adopts S*BGP must be able to process and
react to insecure routing information, so that it can still
route to destination ASes that have not yet adopted S*BGP.
The BGPSEC standard is such that a router only learns a
path via BGPSEC if every AS on that path has adopted
BGPSEC; otherwise, the path is learnt via legacy BGP. (The
reasoning for this is in [48] and Appendix A of [19]):
Secure routes. We call an AS that has adopted S*BGP
a secure AS, and a path learned via S*BGP (i.e., a path
where every AS is secure) a secure path or secure route; all
other paths are called insecure.
If a secure AS can learn both secure and insecure routes,
what role should security play in route selection? To blunt
routing attacks, secure routes should be preferred over inse-
cure routes. But how should expensive or long secure routes
be ranked relative to revenue-generating or short insecure
routes?
2.2 S*BGP routing models.
While it is well known that BGP routing policies differ
between ASes and are often kept private, we need a con-
crete model of ASes’ routing policies so as to analyze and
simulate their behaviors during attacks. The following mod-
els of routing with S*BGP are variations of the well-studied
models from [7,16,17,19,24–26].
AS-level topology. The AS-level topology is represented
by an undirected graph G = (V,E); the set of vertices V
represents ASes and the set of links (edges) E represents
direct BGP links between neighboring ASes. We will some-
times also refer to the “tiers” of ASes [15] in Table 1; the list
of 17 content providers (CPs) in Table 1 (or see Table ??
and Figure 13) was culled from recent empirical work on
interdomain traffic volumes [4, 29–31,47].
ASes’ business relationships. Each edge in E is anno-
tated with a business relationship: either (1) customer-to-
provider, where the customer purchases connectivity from
its provider (our figures depict this with an arrow from cus-
tomer to provider), or (2) peer-to-peer, where two ASes tran-
sit each other’s customer traffic for free (an undirected edge).
Empirical AS topologies. All simulations and exam-
ples described in this paper were run on the UCLA AS-
level topology from 24 September 2012 [12]. We prepro-
cessed the graph by (1) renaming all 4-byte ASNs in more
convenient way, and (2) recursively removing all ASes that
had no providers that had low degree (and were not Tier 1
ISPS). The resulting graph had 39056 ASes, 73442 customer-
provider links and 62129 peer-to-peer links. Because empiri-
cal AS graphs often miss many of peer-to-peer links in Inter-
net eXchange Points (IXP) [3, 5, 45], we constructed a sec-
ond graph where we augmented the UCLA graph with over
550K peer-to-peer edges between ASes listed as members of
the same IXP (on September 24, 2012) on voluntary online
sources (IXPs websites, EuroIX, Peering DB, Packet Clear-
ing House, etc.). Our list contained 332 IXPs and 10,835
mappings of member ASes to IXPs; after connecting every
pair of ASes that are present in the same IXP (and were not
already connected in our original UCLA AS graph) with a
peer-to-peer edge, our graph was augmented with 552933
extra peering links. Because not all ASes at an IXP peer
with each other [3], our augmented graph is an upper bound
on the number of missing links in the AS graph. When we
repeated our simulations on this second graph, we found
that all the aggregate trends we discuss in subsequent sec-
tions still hold, which suggests they are robust to missing
IXP edges. (Results in Appendix J.)
S*BGP routing. ASes running BGP compute routes to
each destination AS d ∈ V independently. For every desti-
nation AS d ∈ V , each source AS s ∈ V \{d} repeatedly uses
its local BGP decision process to select a single “best” route
to d from routes it learns from neighboring ASes. s then
announces this route to a subset of its neighbors according
to its local export policy. An AS s learns a route or has
an available route R if R was announced to s by one of its
neighbors; AS s has or uses a route R if it chooses R from
its set of available routes. AS s has customer (resp., peer,
provider) route if its neighbor on that route is a customer
(resp., peer, provider); see e.g., AS 29518 in Figure 1 left.
2.2.1 Insecure routing policy model.
When choosing between many routes to a destination d,
each insecure AS executes the following (in order):
Local pref (LP): Prefer customer routes over peer routes.
Prefer peer routes over provider routes.
AS paths (SP): Prefer shorter routes over longer routes.
Tiebreak (TB): Use intradomain criteria (e.g., geographic
location, device ID) to break ties among remaining routes.
After selecting a single route as above, an AS announces
that route to a subset of its neighbors:
Export policy (Ex): In the event that the route is via a
customer, the route is exported to all neighbors. Otherwise,
the route is exported to customers only.
The relative ranking of the LP, SP, and TB are standard in
most router implementations [13]. The LP and Ex steps are
based on the classical economic model of BGP routing [16,
17,25,26]. LP captures ASes’ incentives to send traffic along
revenue-generating customer routes, as opposed to routing
through peers (which does not increase revenue), or routing
through providers (which comes at a monetary cost). Ex
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Figure 1: S*BGP Wedgie.
captures ASes’s willi gness to transit traffic only when paid
to do so by a customer.
Robustness to LP model. While this paper reports
results for the above LP model, we also test their robustness
to other models for LP; results are in Appendix K.
2.2.2 Secure routing policy models.
Every secure AS also adds this step to its routing policy.
Secure paths (SecP): Prefer a secure route over an inse-
cure route.
We consider three models for incorporating the SecP step:
Security 1st. The SecP is placed before the LP step; this
model supposes security is an AS’s highest priority.
Security 2nd. The SecP step comes between the LP and
SP steps; this model supposes that an AS places economic
considerations above security concerns.
Security 3rd. The SecP step comes between SP and TB
steps; this model, also used in [19], supposes security is pri-
oritized below business considerations and AS-path length.
2.2.3 The security 1st model is unpopular.
While the security 1st model is the most “idealistic” from
the security perspective, it is likely the least realistic. During
incremental deployment, network operators are expected to
cautiously incorporate S*BGP into routing policies, placing
security 2nd or 3rd, to avoid disruptions due to (1) changes
to traffic engineering, and (2) revenue lost when expensive
secure routes are chosen instead of revenue-generating cus-
tomer routes. The security 1st model might be used only
once these disruptions are absent (e.g., when most ASes
have transitioned to S*BGP), or to protect specific, highly-
sensitive IP prefixes. Indeed, a survey of 100 network opera-
tors [18] found that 10% would rank security 1st, 20% would
rank security 2nd and 41% would rank security 3rd. (The
remaining operators opted not to answer this question.)
2.3 Mixing the models?
It is important to note that in each of our S*BGP routing
models, the prioritization of the SecP step in the route se-
lection process is consistent across ASes. The alternative—
lack of consensus amongst network operators as to where
to place security in the route selection process—can lead
to more than just confusion; it can result in a number of
undesirable phenomena that we discuss next.
2.3.1 Disagreements can lead to BGP Wedgies.
Figure 1. Suppose that all ASes in the network, ex-
cept AS 8928, have deployed S*BGP. The Swedish ISP AS
29518 places security below LP in its route selection pro-
cess, while the Norwegian ISP AS 31283 prioritizes security
above all else (including LP). Thus, while AS 29518 prefers
the customer path through AS 31283, AS 31283 prefers the
secure path through its provider AS 29518. The following
undesirable scenario, called a “BGP Wedgie” [23] can occur.
Initially, the network is in an intended stable routing state2,
in which AS 31283 uses the secure path through its provider
AS 29518 (left). Now suppose the link between AS 31027
and AS 3 fails. Routing now converges to a different stable
state, where AS 29518 prefers the customer path through AS
31283 (right). When the link comes back up, BGP does not
revert to the original stable state, and the system is stuck
in an unintended routing outcome.
“BGP Wedgies” [23] cause unpredictable network behavior
that is difficult to debug. (Sami et al. [46] also showed that
the existence of two stable states, as in Figure 1, implies
that persistent routing oscillations are possible.)
2.3.2 Agreements imply convergence.
In Appendix D we prove that when all ASes prioritize
secure routes the same way, convergence to a single stable
state is guaranteed, regardless of which ASes adopt S*BGP:
Theorem 2.1. S*BGP convergence to a unique stable rout-
ing state is guaranteed in all three S*BGP routing models
even under partial S*BGP deployment.
This holds even in the presence of the attack of Section 3.1,
cf., [35]. This suggests a prescriptive guideline for S*BGP
deployment: ASes should all prioritize security in the same
way. (See Section 5.3 for more guidelines.) The reminder of
this paper supposes that ASes follow this guideline.
3. THREAT MODEL
To quantify “security” in each of our three models, we first
need to discuss what constitutes a routing attack. We focus
on a future scenario where RPKI and origin authentication
are deployed, and the challenge is engineering global S*BGP
adoption. We therefore disregard attacks that are prevented
by origin authentication, e.g., prefix- and subprefix-hijacks [7,
9, 10, 14, 39] (when an attacker originates a prefix, or more
specific subprefix, when not authorized to do so). Instead,
we focus on attacks that are effective even in the presence of
origin authentication, as these are precisely the attacks that
S*BGP is designed to prevent.
Previous studies on S*BGP security [6, 11, 22] focused on
the endgame scenario, where S*BGP is fully deployed, mak-
ing the crucial assumption that any secure AS that learns
an insecure route from one of its neighbors can safely ig-
nore that route. This assumption is invalid in the context
of a partial deployment of S*BGP, where S*BGP coexists
alongside BGP. In this setting, some destinations may only
be reachable via insecure routes. Moreover, even a secure
AS may prefer to use an insecure route for economic or per-
formance reasons (as in our security 2nd or 3rd models).
Therefore, propagating a bogus AS path using legacy inse-
cure BGP [22, 43] (an attack that is effective against fully-
deployed origin authentication) can also work against some
secure ASes when S*BGP is partially deployed.
3.1 The attack.
We focus on the scenario where a single attacker AS m
attacks a single destination AS d; all ASes except m use
the policies in Section 2.2. The attacker m’s objective is
2A routing state, i.e., the route chosen by each AS s ∈
V \{d} to destination d, is stable if any AS s that re-runs its
route selection algorithm does not change its route [24].
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Figure 2: Protocol downgrade attack; Sec 2nd.
to maximize the number of source ASes that send traffic
to m, rather than d. This commonly-used objective func-
tion [7,21,22] reflects m’s incentive to attract (and therefore
tamper / eavesdrop / drop) traffic from as many source ASes
as possible. (We deal with the fact that ASes can source dif-
ferent amounts of traffic [31] in Sections 4.5, 5.2.2, 5.3.1.)
Attacker’s strategy. The attacker m wants to convince
ASes to route to m, instead of the legitimate destination
AS d that is authorized to originate the prefix under attack.
It will do this by sending bogus AS-path information using
legacy BGP. What AS path information should m propa-
gate? A straightforward extension of the results in [22] to
our models shows it is NP-hard for m to determine a bogus
route to export to each neighbor that maximizes the number
of source ASes it attracts. As such, we consider the arguably
simplest, yet very disruptive [7, 22], attack: the attacker,
which is not actually a neighbor of the destination d, pre-
tends to be directly connected to d. Since there is no need to
explicitly include IP prefixes in our models, this translates to
a single attacker AS m announcing the bogus AS-level path
“m, d” using legacy BGP to all its neighbor ASes. Since
the path is announced via legacy BGP, recipient ASes will
not validate it with S*BGP, and thus will not learn that it
is bogus. (This attack is equally effective against partially-
deployed soBGP, S-BGP and BGPSEC. With soBGP, the
attacker claims to have an edge to d that does not exist in
the graph. With S-BGP or BGPSEC the attacker claims to
have learned a path “m, d” that d never announced.)
3.2 Are secure ASes subject to attacks?
Ideally, we would like a secure AS with a secure route to
be protected from a routing attack. Unfortunately, however,
this is not always the case. We now discuss a troubling
aspect of S*BGP in partial deployment [27]:
Protocol downgrade attack. In a protocol downgrade
attack, a source AS that uses a secure route to the legit-
imate destination under normal conditions, downgrades to
an insecure bogus route during an attack.
The best way to explain this is via an example:
Figure 2. We show how AS 21740, a webhosting company,
suffers a protocol downgrade attack, in the security 2nd (or
3rd) model. Under normal conditions (left), AS 21740 has a
secure provider route directly to the destination Level 3 AS
3356, a Tier 1 ISP. (AS 21740 does not have a peer route via
AS 174 due to Ex.) During the attack (right), m announces
that it is directly connected to Level3, and so AS 21740 sees
a bogus, insecure 4-hop peer route, via his peer AS 174.
Importantly, AS 21740 has no idea that this route is bogus;
it looks just like any other route that might be announced
with legacy BGP. In the security 2nd (and 3rd) model, AS
21740 prefers an insecure peer route over a secure provider
route, and will therefore downgrade to the bogus route.
In Section 5.3.1, we show that protocol-downgrade attacks
can be a serious problem, rendering even large partial de-
ployments of S*BGP ineffective against attacks.
Downgrades are avoided in the security 1st model.
Protocol downgrade attacks can happen in the security 2nd
and 3rd models, but not when security is 1st:
Theorem 3.1. In the security 1st model, for every at-
tacker AS m, destination AS d, and AS s that, in normal
conditions, has a secure route to d that does not go through
m, s will use a secure route to d even during m’s attack.
The proof is in Appendix F. While the theorem holds only
if the attacker m is not on AS s’s route, this is not a severe
restriction because, otherwise, m would attract traffic from
s to d even without attacking.
4. INVARIANTS TO DEPLOYMENT
Given the vast number of possible configurations for a
partial deployment of S*BGP, we present a framework for
exploring the security benefits of S*BGP vis-a-vis origin au-
thentication, without making any assumptions about which
ASes are secure. To do this, we show how to quantify secu-
rity (Section 4.1), discuss how to determine an upper bound
on security available with any S*BGP deployment for any
routing model (Section 4.3.1), finally compare it to the secu-
rity available with origin authentication (Section 4.2, 4.4).
4.1 Quantifying security: A metric.
We quantify improvements in “security” by determining
the fraction of ASes that avoid attacks (per Section 3.1).
The attacker’s goal is to attract traffic from as many ASes as
possible; our metric therefore measures the average fraction
of ASes that do not choose a route to the attacker.
Metric. Suppose the ASes in set S are secure and consider
an attacker m that attacks a destination d. Let H(m, d, S)
be the number of “happy” source ASes that choose a legiti-
mate route to d instead of a bogus route to m. (See Table 2).
Our metric is:
HM,D(S) =
1
|D|(|M|−1)(|V |−2)
∑
m∈M
∑
d∈D\{m}
H(m, d, S)
Since we cannot predict where an attack will come from, or
which ASes it will target, the metric averages over all attack-
ers in a set M and destinations in a set D; we can choose M
and D to be any subset of the ASes in the graph, depend-
ing on (i) where we expect attacks to come from, and (ii)
which destinations we are particularly interested in protect-
ing. When we want to capture the idea that all destinations
are of equal importance, we average over all destinations;
note that “China’s 18 minute mystery” of 2010 [14] fits into
this framework well, since the hijacker targeted prefixes orig-
inated by a large number of (seemingly random) destination
ASes. However, we can also zoom in on important destina-
tions D (e.g., content providers [9,31,42]) by averaging over
those destinations only. We can, analogously, zoom in on
certain types of attackers M by averaging over them only.
Averaging over fixed sets D and M (that are independent
of S) also allows us to compare security across deployments
S and routing policy models.
Tiebreaking & bounds on the metric. Recall from
Section 2.2 that our model fully determines an AS’s rout-
happy Chooses a legitimate secure/insecure route to d.
unhappy Chooses a bogus insecure route to m.
immune Happy regardless of which ASes are secure.
doomed Unhappy regardless of which ASes are secure.
protectable Neither immune nor doomed.
Table 2: Status of source s when m attacks d.
ing decision up to the tiebreak step TB of its routing pol-
icy. Since computing HM,D(S) only requires us to distin-
guish between “happy” and “unhappy” ASes, the tiebreak
step matters only when a source AS s has to choose be-
tween (1) an insecure route(s) to the legitimate destination
d (that makes it happy), and (2) an insecure bogus route(s)
to m (that makes it unhappy). Importantly, s has no idea
which route is bogus and which is legitimate, as both of
them are insecure. Therefore, to avoid making uninformed
guesses about how ASes choose between equally-good inse-
cure routes, we will compute upper and lower bounds on
our metric; to get a lower bound, we assume that every AS
s in the aforementioned situation will always choose to be
unhappy (i.e., option (2)); the upper bound is obtained by
assuming s always chooses to be happy (i.e., (1)). See also
Appendix E.
Algorithms. Our metric is determined by computing
routing outcomes, each requiring time O(|V |), over all pos-
sible |M ||D| attacker and destination pairs. We sometimes
takeM = D = V so that our computations approachO(|V |3);
the parallel algorithms we developed for this purpose are
presented in Appendix B, H.
4.2 Origin authentication gives good security.
At this point, we could compute the metric for various
S*BGP deployment scenarios, show that most source ASes
are “happy”, argue that S*BGP has improved security, and
conclude our analysis. This, however, would not give us the
full picture, because it is possible that most of the happy
ASes would have been happy even if S*BGP had not been de-
ployed. Thus, to understand if the juice is worth the squeeze,
we need to ask how many more attacks are prevented by a
particular S*BGP deployment scenario, relative to those al-
ready prevented by RPKI with origin authentication. More
concretely, we need to compare the fraction of happy ASes
before and after the ASes in S deploy S*BGP. To do this, we
compare the metric for a deployment scenario S against the
“baseline scenario”, where RPKI and origin authentication
are in place, but no AS has adopted S*BGP, so that the set
of secure ASes is S = ∅.
In [22], the authors evaluated the efficacy of origin authen-
tication against attacks that it was not designed to prevent
— namely, the “m, d” attack of Section 3.1. They randomly
sampled pairs of attackers and destinations and plotted the
distribution of the fraction of “unhappy” source ASes (ASes
that route through the attacker, see Table 2). Figure 3 of [22]
shows that attacker is able to attract traffic from less than
half of the source ASes in the AS graph, on average. We now
perform a computation and obtain a result that is similar in
spirit; rather than randomly sampling pairs of attackers and
destinations as in [22], we instead compute a lower bound on
our metric over all possible attackers and destinations. We
find that HV,V (∅) ≥ 60% on the basic UCLA graph, and
HV,V (∅) ≥ 62% on our IXP-augmented graph.
It is striking that both our and [22]’s result indicate more
than half of the AS graph is already happy even before
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S*BGP is deployed. To understand why this is the case,
recall that with origin authentication, an attacking AS m
must announce a bogus path “m, d” that is one hop longer
than the path “d” announced by the legitimate destination
AS d. When we average over all (m, d) pairs and all the
source ASes, bogus paths through m will appear longer, on
average, than legitimate paths through d. Since path length
plays an important role in route selection, on average, more
source ASes choose the legitimate route.
4.3 Does S*BGP give better security?
How much further can we get with a partial deployment
of S*BGP? We now obtain bounds on the improvements in
security that are possible for a given routing policy model,
but for any set S of secure ASes.
We can obtain these bounds thanks to the following cru-
cial observation: ASes can be partitioned into three dis-
tinct categories with respect to each attacker-destination
pair (m, d). Some ASes are doomed to route through the
attacker regardless of which ASes are secure. Others are
immune to the attack regardless of which ASes are secure.
Only the remaining ASes are protectable, in the sense that
whether or not they route through the attacker depends on
which ASes are secure (see Table 2).
To bound our metric HM,D(S) for a given routing policy
model (i.e., security 1st, 2nd, or 3rd) and across all partial-
deployment scenarios S, we first partition source ASes into
categories — doomed, immune, and protectable — for each
(m, d) pair and each routing policy model. By computing
the average fraction of immune ASes across all (m, d) ∈
M × D for a given routing model, we get a lower bound
on HM,D(S) ∀S and that routing model. We similarly get
an upper bound on HM,D(S) by computing the average frac-
tion of ASes that are not doomed.
4.3.1 Partitions: Doomed, protectable & immune.
We return to Figure 2 to explain our partitioning:
Doomed. A source AS s is doomed with respect to pair
(m, d) if s routes through m no matter which set S of ASes
is secure. AS 174 in Figure 2 is doomed when security is 2nd
(or 3rd). If security is 2nd (or 3rd), AS 174 always prefers
the bogus customer route to the attacker over a (possibly
secure) peer path to the destination AS 3356, for every S.
Immune. A source AS s is immune with respect to pair
(m, d) if s will route through d no matter which set S of
ASes is secure. AS 3536 in Figure 2 is one example; this
single-homed stub customer of the destination AS 3356 can
never learn a bogus route in any of our security models.
When security is 2nd or 3rd, another example of an immune
AS is AS 10310 in Figure 14; its customer route to the legit-
imate destination AS 40426 is always more attractive than
its provider route to the attacker in these models.
Protectable. AS s is protectable with respect to pair
(m, d) if it can either choose the legitimate route to d, or
the bogus one to m, depending on S. With security 1st,
AS 174 in Figure 2 becomes protectable. If it has a secure
route to the destination AS 3356, AS 174 will choose it and
be happy; if not, it will choose the bogus route to m.
4.3.2 Which ASes are protectable?
The intuition behind the following partitioning of ASes is
straightforward. The subtleties involved in proving that an
AS is doomed/immune are discussed in Appendix E.
Security 1st. Here, we suppose that all ASes are pro-
tectable; the few exceptions (e.g., the single-homed stub of
Figure 2) have little impact on the count of protectable ASes.
Security 2nd. Here, an AS is doomed if it has a route
to the attacker with better local preference LP than every
available route to the legitimate destination; (e.g., the bogus
customer route offered to AS 174 in Figure 2 has higher LP
than the legitimate peer route). An immune AS has a route
to the destination that has higher LP than every route to
the attacker. For protectable AS, its best available routes
to the attacker and destination have exactly the same LP.
Security 3rd. Here, a doomed AS has a path to m with
(1) better LP OR (2) equal LP and shorter length SP,
than every available path to d. The opposite holds for an
immune AS. A protectable AS has best available routes to
m and d with equal LP and path length SP.
4.4 Bounding security for all deployments.
For each routing model, we found the fraction of doomed/
protectable / immune source ASes for each attacker destina-
tion pair (m, d), and took the average over all (m, d) ∈ V×V .
We used these values to get upper- and lower bounds on
HV,V (S) for all deployments S, for each routing model.
Figure 3: The colored parts of each bar represent the av-
erage fraction of immune, protectable, and doomed source
ASes, averaged over all O(|V |2) possible pairs of attackers
and destinations. Since HV,V (S) is an average of the frac-
tion of happy source ASes over all pairs of attackers and
destinations, the upper bound on the metric HV,V (S) ∀S is
the average fraction of source ASes that are not doomed.
The upper bound on the metric HV,V (S) ∀S is therefore:
≈ 100% with security 1st, 89% with security 2nd, and 75%
with security 3rd. (The same figure computed on our IXP-
edge-augmented graph looks almost exactly the same, with
the proportions being ≈ 100%, 90% and 77%.) Meanwhile,
the heavy solid line is the lower bound on the metric HV,V (∅)
in the baseline setting where S = ∅ and there is only origin
authentication; in Section 4.2 we found that HV,V (∅) = 60%
(and 62% for the IXP-edge-augmented graph). Therefore,
we can bound the maximum change in our security metric
HV,V (S) ∀S for each routing policy model by computing the
distance between the solid line and the boundary between
the fraction of doomed and protectable ASes. We find:
Security 3rd: Little improvement. Figure 3 shows that
the maximum gains over origin authentication that are pro-
vided by the security 3rd model are quite slim — at most
15% — regardless of which ASes are secure. (This follows
because the upper bound on the metric HV,V (S) ≤ 75%
for any S while the lower bound on the baseline setting is
HV,V (∅) ≥ 60%.) Moreover, these are the maximum gains
∀S; in a realistic S*BGP deployment, the gains are likely to
be much smaller. This result is disappointing, since the secu-
rity 3rd model is likely to be the most preferred by network
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Figure 4: Partitions by destination tier. Sec 3rd.
operators (Section 2.2.3), but it is not especially surprising.
S*BGP is designed to prevent path shortening attacks; how-
ever, in the security 3rd model ASes prefer short (possibly
bogus) insecure routes over a long secure routes, so it is nat-
ural that this model realizes only minimal security benefits.
Security 2nd: More improvement. Meanwhile, route
security is prioritized above route length with the security 2nd
model, so we could hope for better security benefits. Indeed,
Figure 3 confirms that the maximum gains over origin au-
thentication are better: 89−60 = 29%. But can these gains
be realized in realistic partial-deployment scenarios? We
answer this in question in Section 5.
Decreasing numbers of immune ASes? The fraction
of immune ASes in the security 2nd (12%) and 1st (≈ 0%)
models is (strangely) lower than the fraction of happy ASes
in the baseline scenario (60%). How is this possible? In
Section 6.1.1 we explain this counterintuitive observation by
showing that more secure ASes can sometimes result in less
happy ASes; these “collateral damages”, that occur only in
the security 1st and 2nd models, account for the decrease in
the number of immune ASes.
4.5 Robustness to destination tier.
Thus far, we have been averaging our results over all pos-
sible attacker-destination pairs in the graph. However, some
destination ASes might be particularly important to secure,
perhaps because they source important content (e.g., the
content provider ASes (CPs)) or transit large volumes of
traffic (the Tier 1 ASes). As such, we broke down the met-
ric over destinations in each tier in Table 1.
Figure 4. We show the partitioning into immune / pro-
tectable / doomed ASes in the security 3rd model, but this
time averaged individually over all destinations in each tier,
and all possible attackers V . The thick horizontal line over
each vertical bar again shows the corresponding lower bound
on our metric HV,Tier(∅) when no AS is secure. Apart from
the Tier 1s (discussed next), we observe similar trends as in
Section 4.4, with the improvement in security ranging from
8 − 15% for all tiers; the same holds for the security 2nd
model, shown in Figure 5.
4.6 It’s difficult to protect Tier 1 destinations.
Strangely enough, Figure 4 shows that when Tier 1 des-
tinations are attacked in the security 3rd model, the vast
majority (≈ 80%) of ASes are doomed, and only a tiny frac-
tion are protectable; the same holds when security is 2nd
(Figure 5). Therefore, in these models, S*BGP can do little
to blunt attacks on Tier 1 destinations.
How can it be that Tier 1s, the largest and best connected
(at least in terms of customer-provider edges) ASes in our
AS graph, are the most vulnerable to attacks? Ironically, it
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Figure 6: Partitions by attacker tier. Sec 3rd.
is the Tier 1s’ very connectivity that harms their security.
Because the Tier 1s are so well-connected, they can charge
most of their neighbors for Internet service. As a result,
most ASes reach the Tier 1s via costly provider paths that
are the least preferred type of path according to the LP
step in our routing policy models. Meanwhile, it turns out
that when a Tier 1 destination is attacked, most source ASes
will learn a bogus path to the attacker that is not through
a provider, and is therefore preferred over the (possibly se-
cure) provider route to the T1 destination in the security 2nd
or 3rd models. In fact, this is exactly what lead to the pro-
tocol downgrade attack on the Tier 1 destination AS 3356
in Figure 2. We will later (Section 5.3.1) find that this is a
serious hurdle to protecting Tier 1 destinations.
4.7 Which attackers cause the most damage?
Next, we break things down by the type of the attacker, to
get a sense of type of attackers that S*BGP is best equipped
to defend against.
Figure 6. We bucket our counts of doomed, protectable,
and immune ASes for the security 3rd model by the attacker
type in Table 1, for all |V |2 possible attacker-destination
pairs. As the degree of the attacker increases, it’s attack be-
comes more effective; the number of immune ASes steadily
decreases, and the number of doomed ASes correspondingly
increases, as the the tier of the attacker grows from stub to
Tier 2. Meanwhile, the number of protectable ASes remains
roughly constant across tiers. The striking exception to this
trend is that the the Tier 1 attacker is significantly less ef-
fective than even the lowest degree (stub) attackers. While
at this observation might seem unnatural at first, there is a
perfectly reasonable explanation: when a Tier 1 attacks, its
bogus route will look like a provider route from the perspec-
tive of most other source ASes in the graph. Because the
LP step of our routing model depreferences provider routes
relative to peer and customer routes, the Tier 1 attacker’s
bogus route will be less attractive than any legitimate route
through a peer or provider, and as such most ASes will be
immune to the attack. The same observations hold when
security is 2nd.
Tier 1s can still be protected as sources. However,
before we completely give up on the Tier 1s obtaining any
benefit from S*BGP, we reproduced Figures 4 - 5 but this
time, bucketing the results by the tier of source. (Figure
omitted.) We found that each source tier, including the Tier
1s, has roughly the same average number of doomed (25%),
immune (60%), and protectable (15%) ASes. It follows that,
while S*BGP cannot protect Tier 1 destinations from attack,
S*BGP still has the potential to prevent a Tier 1 sources
from choosing a bogus route.
Robustness of results. We repeated this analysis on
our IXP-augmented graph (Appendix J) and using different
routing policies (Appendix K). Please see the appendices
for details.
5. DEPLOYMENT SCENARIOS
In Section 4.4 we presented upper bounds on the improve-
ments in security from S*BGP deployment for choice of se-
cure ASes S. We found that while only meagre improve-
ments over origin authentication are possible in the security
3rd model, better results are possible in the security 2nd and
1st models. However, achieving the bounds in Section 4.4
could require full S*BGP deployment at every AS. What
happens in more realistic deployment scenarios? First, we
find that the security 2nd model often behaves disappoint-
ingly like the security 3rd model. We also find that Tier 1
destinations remain most vulnerable to attacks when secu-
rity is 2nd or 3rd. We conclude the section by presenting
prescriptive guidelines for partial S*BGP deployment.
Robustness to missing IXP edges. We repeated the
analysis in Section 5.2-5.3 over the AS graph augmented
with IXP peering edges and saw almost identical trends. We
see a slightly higher baseline of happy ASes when S = ∅ (Sec-
tion 4.4), which almost always causes the improvement in
the metric (over the baseline scenario) to be slightly smaller
for this graph. (Plots in Appendix J.)
5.1 It’s hard to decide whom to secure.
We first need to decide which ASes to secure. Ideally, we
could choose the smallest set of ASes that maximizes the
value of the metric. To formalize this, consider the follow-
ing computational problem, that we call “Max-k-Security”:
Given an AS graph, a specific attacker-destination pair (m, d),
and a parameter k > 0, find a set S of secure ASes of size k
that maximizes the total number of happy ASes. Then:
Theorem 5.1. Max-k-Security is NP-hard in all three rout-
ing policy models.
The proof is in Appendix I. This result can be extended to
the problem of choosing the set of secure ASes that maximize
the number of happy ASes over multiple attacker-destination
pairs (which is what our metric computes).
5.2 Large partial deployments.
Instead of focusing on choosing the optimum set S of ASes
to secure (an intractable feat), we will instead consider a few
partial deployment scenarios among high-degree ASes S, as
suggested in practice [44] and in the literature [6, 11,19].
Non-stub attackers. We now suppose that the set of at-
tackers is the set of non-stub ASe in our graph M ′ (i.e., not
“Stubs” or “Stubs-x” per Table 1). Ruling out stub ASes is
consistent with the idea that stubs cannot launch attacks if
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Figure 7: Tier 1+2 rollout: For each step S in
rollout, upper and lower bounds on (a) HM′,V (S) −
HM′,V (∅) and (b) HM′,V (S) − HM′,d(∅) averaged over
all d ∈ S. The x-axis is the number of non-stub ASes
in S. The “error bars” are explained in Section 5.3.2.
their providers perform prefix filtering [10,22], a functional-
ity that can be achieved via IRRs [1] or even the RPKI [41],
and does not require S*BGP.
5.2.1 Security across all destinations.
Gill et al. [19] suggest bootstrapping S*BGP deployment
by having secure ISPs deploy S*BGP in their customers that
are stub ASes. We therefore consider this “rollout”:
Tier 1 & Tier 2 rollout. Other than the empty set,
we consider three different secure sets. We secure X Tier
1’s and Y Tier 2’s and all of their stubs, where (X,Y ) ∈
{(13, 13), (13, 37), (13, 100)}; this corresponds to securing about
33%, 40%, and 50% of the AS graph.
The results are shown in Figure 7(a), which plots, for each
routing policy model, the increase in the upper- and lower
bound on HM′,V (S) (Section 4.1) for each set S of secure
ASes in the rollout (y-axis), versus the number of non-stub
ASes in S (x-axis). We make a few important observations:
Tiebreaking can seal an AS’s fate. Even with a large
deployment of S*BGP, the improvement in security is highly
dependent on the vagarities of the intradomain tiebreaking
criteria used to decide between insecure routes. (See also
Section 4.1’s discussion on tiebreaking.) Even when we se-
cure 50% of ASes in the security 1st model (the last step
of our rollout), there is still a gap of more than 10% be-
tween the lower and upper bounds of our metric. Thus,
in a partial S*BGP deployment, there is a large fraction of
ASes that are balanced on a knife’s edge between an inse-
cure legitimate route and an insecure bogus route; only the
(unknown-to-us) intradomain routing policies of these ASes
can save them from attack. This is inherent to any partial
deployment of S*BGP, even in the security 1st model.
Meagre improvements even when security is 2nd. As
expected, the biggest improvements come in the security
1st model, where ASes make security their highest priority
and deprecate all economic and operational considerations.
When security is 1st and 50% of the AS graph is secure
(at the last step in the rollout), the improvement over the
baseline scenario is significant; about 24%. While we might
hope that the security 2nd model would present improve-
ments that are similar to those achieved when security is
1st, this is unfortunately not the case. In both the security
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Figure 8: Tier 1+2+CP rollout: HM′,CP (S) −
HM′,C(∅) for each step in the rollout. The x-axis
is the number of non-stub, non-CP ASes in S.
2nd and 3rd models we see similarly disappointing increases
in our metric. We explain this observation in Section 6.2.
5.2.2 Focus on the content providers?
Since much of the Internet’s traffic originates at the con-
tent providers (CPs), we might consider the impact of S*BGP
deployment on CPs only. We considered the same rollout
as above, but with all 17 CPs secure, and computed the
metric over CP destinations only, i.e., HM′,CP (S). The re-
sults, presented in Figure 8, are very similar to those in
Figure 7(a): improvements of at least 26% 9.4%, and 4% for
security 1st, 2nd, and 3rd respectively. We note, however,
that CP destinations have a higher fraction of happy sources
than other destinations on average, (see Figure 4).
5.2.3 Different destinations see different benefits.
Thus far, we have looked at the impact of S*BGP in ag-
gregate across all destinations d ∈ V (or d ∈ CP ). Because
secure routes can only exist to secure destinations, we now
look at the impact of S*BGP on individual secure destina-
tions d ∈ S, by considering HM′,d(S).
Figure 7(b). We plot the upper and lower bounds on the
change in the metric, i.e., HM′,d(S) − HM′,d(∅), averaged
across secure destinations only, i.e., d ∈ S. As expected,
we find large improvements when security is 1st, and small
improvements when security is 3rd. Interestingly, however,
when security is 2nd the metric does increase by 13 − 20%
by the last step in the rollout; while this is still significantly
smaller than what is possible when security is 1st, it does
suggest that at least some secure destinations benefit more
when security is 2nd, rather than 3rd.
For more insight, we zoom in on this last step in our rollout:
Figure 9. For the last step in our rollout, we plot up-
per and lower bounds on the change in the metric, i.e.,
HM′,d(S)−HM′,d(∅), for each individual secure destination
d ∈ S. For each of our three models, the lower bound for
each d ∈ S is plotted as a non-decreasing sequence; these are
the three “smooth” lines. The corresponding upper bound
for each d ∈ S was plotted as well. For security 1st, the up-
per and lower bounds are almost identical, and for security
2nd and 3rd, the upper bounds are the “clouds” that hover
over the lower bounds. A few observations:
Security 1st provides excellent protection. We find
that when security is 1st, a secure destination can reap the
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Figure 9: Non-decreasing sequence of HM′,d(S) −
HM′,d(∅) ∀ d ∈ S. S is all T1s, T2s, and their stubs.
full benefits of S*BGP even in (a large) partial deployment.
To see this, we computed the true value of HM′,d(S) for all
secure destinations d ∈ S, and found that it was between
96.8− 97.9% on average (across all d ∈ S).
Security 2nd and 3rd are similar for many destina-
tions. Figure 9 also reveals that many destinations obtain
roughly the same benefits from S*BGP when security is 2nd
as when security is 3rd. Indeed, 93% of 7500 secure destina-
tions that see < 4% (lower-bound) improvement in Figure 9
when security is 3rd, do the same when security is 2nd as
well. What is the reason for this? There are certain types
of protocol downgrade attacks that succeed both when se-
curity is 2nd and when security is 3rd (i.e., when the bogus
path has better LP than the legitimate path, see e.g., Fig-
ure 2). In Section 6.2 we shall show that protocol downgrade
attacks are the most significant reason for the metric to de-
grade; therefore, for destinations where these “LP-based”
protocol downgrade attacks are most common, the security
2nd model looks much like the security 3rd model.
Tier 1s do best when security is 1st, and worst when
it is 2nd or 3rd. When security is 1st, our data also shows
that the secure destinations that obtain the largest (> 40%)
increases in their security metric HM′,d(S) (relative to the
baseline setting HM′,d(∅)) include: (a) all 13 Tier 1s, and
(b) ≥ 99% of “Tier 1 stub” destinations (i.e., stub ASes such
that all their providers are Tier 1 ASes). On the other hand,
these same destinations experience the worst improvements
when security is 2nd or 3rd (i.e., a lower bound of < 3%).
To explain this, recall from Section 4.6 that when secu-
rity is 2nd or 3rd, most source ASes that want to reach a
Tier 1 destination are doomed, because of protocol down-
grade attacks like the one shown in Figure 2. This explains
the meagre benefits these destinations obtain when security
is 2nd or 3rd. On the other hand, protocol downgrade at-
tacks fail when security is 1st. Therefore, in the security
1st model, the Tier 1 destinations (and by extension, Tier 1
stub destinations) obtain excellent security when S*BGP is
partially deployed; moreover, they see most significant gains
simply because they were so highly vulnerable to attacks in
the absence of S*BGP (Figure 4, Section 4.6).
Security 2nd helps some secure destinations. Finally,
when security is 2nd, about half of the secure destinations
d ∈ S see benefits that are discernibly better than what is
possible when security is 3rd, though not quite as impressive
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Figure 10: Non-decreasing sequence of HM′,d(S) −
HM′,d(∅) ∀ d ∈ S. S is all T2s, and their stubs.
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Figure 11: Tier 2 rollout: HM′,D(S) − HM′,D(∅) for
each step in the T2 rollout. The x-axis is the number
of non-stub, non-CP ASes in S.
as those when security is 1st. These destinations include
some Tier 2s and their stubs, but never any Tier 1s.
Similar observations hold for earlier steps in the rollout.
5.2.4 What happens when the Tier 1s are not secure?
The results of the previous section motivate considering a
deployment that excludes securing the Tier 1 ISPs.
Secure just the Tier 2s? We reproduce the analysis of
Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.3 with a rollout among only the
Tier 2s and theirs stubs. There are 100 Tier 2 ISPs in our
AS graph (Table 1), and our Tier 2 rollout secures Y Tier
2 ASes, and all of their stubs, where Y ∈ {13, 26, 50, 100};
this amounts to securing about 18%, 24%, 30%, and 38% of
ASes.
The results in Figure 11 are similar to those in Fig-
ure 7(a), except that the metric grows even more slowly,
and we see smaller improvements when security is 1st. This
is consistent with our earlier observation (Section 5.2.3) that
the most dramatic improvements observed when security is
1st are for Tier 1 destinations; the improvements for Tier 2
destinations and their stubs are much smaller when security
is 1st. This causes the gap between the security 2nd and 1st
models to become smaller for the Tier 2 rollout (relative to
the Tier 1+2 rollout of Section 5.2.3); this can be observed
from Figure 10 which reproduces the results of Figure 9 for
the last step of the Tier 2 rollout. However, the gap between
security 2nd and 1st is smaller not only because Tier 2s see
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Figure 12: Non-decreasing sequence of HM′,d(S) −
HM′,d(∅) ∀ d ∈ S. S is all non stubs.
bigger improvements when security is 2nd model; this is also
because they see worse improvements when security is 1st.
Secure just the nonstubs? Finally, we consider secur-
ing only non-stub ASes (i.e., 6178 ASes or 15% of the AS
graph). We see a 6.2%, 4.7% and 2.2% worst-case improve-
ment in the metric HM′,D(S) when security is 1
st, 2nd, and
3rd respectively; this scenario therefore is similar to last step
in our Tier 2 rollout, with exception that the gap between
the security 2nd and 1st model is even smaller. This is cor-
roborated by Figure 12, which reproduces the results of
Figure 9 for the scenario where only non-stub ASes are se-
cure. We see that the benefits available when security is 2nd
almost reach those that are possible when security is 1st.
Summary. Taken together, our suggest that in the security
1st model, destinations that are Tier 1s or their stubs see the
largest improvements in security. In such cases, the security
2nd model behaves much like the security 3rd model. How-
ever, in cases where Tier 1s and their stubs are not secure,
the gap between the security 2nd and 1st model diminishes,
in exchange for smaller gains when security is 1st.
5.3 Prescriptive deployment guidelines.
Section 2.3 suggested that ASes use consistent routing
policies. We now suggest a few more deployment guidelines.
5.3.1 On the choice of early adopters.
Previous work [6, 11, 19] suggests that Tier 1s should be
the earliest adopters of S*BGP. However, the discussion in
Sections 4.6 and 5.2.3 suggests that securing Tier 1s might
not lead to good security benefits at the early adoption stage,
when ASes are most likely to rank security 2nd or 3rd. We
now confirm this.
All Tier 1s and their stubs. Even in a deployment that
includes all 13 Tier 1 ASes and their stubs (i.e., 7872 ASes
or ≈ 20% of the AS graph), improvements in security were
almost imperceptible. With security 2nd or 3rd, the average
change in HM′,d(S)−HM′,d(∅) over secure destinations d ∈
S causes the metric to increase by < 0.2%.
Tier 1s, their stubs, and content providers. Follow-
ing [19, 44], we consider securing the CPs, the Tier 1s and
all of their stubs, and obtained similar results.
Analysis. Why is a deployment at more than 20% of the
ASes in AS graph, including the large and well-connected
Tier 1s, provide so little improvement in security? Recall
that in Section 4.6 and Figure 4, we showed that when Tier
1 destinations are attacked, the vast majority of source ASes
are doomed and almost none are protectable. It follows that
if a source retains a secure route to a Tier 1 destination dur-
ing an attack, that source is likely to be immune. The same
argument also applies to other secure destinations (i.e., CPs
of stub customers of T1s); this is because, in the deployment
scenarios above, most secure routes traverse a Tier 1 as their
first hop. Because almost every source AS that continued
to use a secure route during an attack would have routed to
the legitimate destination even if no AS was secure, we see
little improvements in our security metric.
Figure 13 confirms this. We show what happens to the
secure routes to each CP destination when security is 3rd;
similar observations hold when security is 2nd. The height
of each bar is the fraction of routes to each CP destination
that are secure under normal conditions. The lower part
of the bar shows secure routes that were lost to protocol
downgrade attacks (averaged over all attacks by non-stubs
in M ′), and the middle part shows the fraction of secure
routes from immune source ASes to the destination. We
clearly see that (1) most secure routes are lost to protocol
downgrade attacks, and (2) almost all the secure routes that
remain during attacks from source ASes that are immune.
Choose Tier 2s as early adopters. We found that
early deployments at the Tier 2 ISPs actually fare better
than those at the larger, and better connected Tier 1s. For
example, securing the 13 largest Tier 2s (in terms of cus-
tomer degree) and all their stubs (a total of 6918 ASes), the
average change in HM′,d(S)−HM′,d(∅) over secure destina-
tions d ∈ S is ≈ 1% when security is 2nd or 3rd. This also
agree with our observations in Section 5.2.4.
5.3.2 Use simplex S*BGP at stubs.
Next, we consider [19, 33]’s suggestion for reducing com-
plexity by securing stubs with simplex S*BGP.
Simplex S*BGP. Stub ASes have no customers of their
own, and therefore (by Ex) they will never send S*BGP an-
nouncements for routes through other ASes. They will, how-
ever, announce routes to their own IP prefixes. For this rea-
son [19,33] suggests either (1) allowing ISPs to send S*BGP
messages on behalf of their stub customers or (2) allowing
stubs to deploy S*BGP in a unidirectional manner, send-
ing outgoing S*BGP messages but receiving legacy BGP
messages. Since a stub propagates only outgoing BGP an-
nouncements for a very small number of IP prefixes (namely,
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Figure 13: What happens to secure routes to each
CP destination during attack. S is the Tier 1s, the
CPs, and all their stubs and security is 3rd.
Security model 1st 2nd 3rd
Protocol downgrade attacks X X X
Collateral benefits X X X
Collateral damages X X X
Table 3: Phenomena in different security models
the prefixes owned by that stub), simplex mode can decrease
computational load, and make S*BGP adoption less costly.
Given that 85% of ASes are stubs, does this harm security?
Figure 7(a)-7(b). The “error bars” in Figure 7(a)-7(b)
show what happens when we suppose that all stubs run sim-
plex S*BGP. There is little change in the metric. To explain
this, we note that (1) a stub’s routing decision does not affect
any other AS’s routing decision, since by Ex stubs do not
propagate BGP routes from one neighbor to another, and
(2) a stub’s routing decisions are limited by the decisions
made by its providers, so if its providers avoid attacks, so
will the stub, but (3) the stub acts like a secure destination,
and therefore (nonstub) ASes establishing routes to the stub
still benefit from S*BGP. These results indicate that simplex
S*BGP at stubs can lower the complexity of S*BGP deploy-
ment without impacting overall security. Stub ASes that are
concerned about their own security as sources (rather than
destinations) can, of course, always choose to deploy full
S*BGP.
6. ROOT CAUSES & NON-MONOTONICITY
We now examine the reasons for the changes in our secu-
rity metric as S*BGP is deployed. We start by discussing
two subtle phenomena: the collateral damages and collat-
eral benefits incurred by insecure ASes from the deployment
of S*BGP at other ASes. We then use these phenomena in
a root-cause analysis of the results of Section 5.
6.1 Security is not monotonic!
The most obvious desiderata from S*BGP deployment is
that the Internet should become only more secure as more
ASes adopt S*BGP. Unfortunately, however, this is not al-
ways the case. Security is not monotonic, in the sense that
securing more ASes can actually make other ASes unhappy.
To explain this, we use a running example taken from the
UCLA AS graph, where the destination (victim) AS d is
Pandora’s AS40426 (a content provider) and the attacker m
is an anonymized Tier 2 network. We consider the network
before and after a partial deployment of S*BGP S and see
how the set of happy ASes changes; S consists of all 100 Tier
2s, all 17 content providers, and all of their stubs.
6.1.1 Collateral Damages
Figure 14. We show how AS 52142, a Polish ISP, suffers
from collateral damage when security is 2nd. On the left, we
show the network prior to S*BGP deployment. AS 52142 is
offered two paths, both insecure: a 3-hop path through his
provider AS 5617 to the legitimate destination AS 40426,
and a 5-hop bogus route to the attacker. (The route to m is
really 4 hops long, but m (falsely) claims a link to AS 40426
so AS 52142 thinks it is 5 hops long.) AS 52142 will choose
the legitimate route because it is shorter. On the right, we
show the network after S*BGP deployment. AS 5617 has
become secure and now prefers the secure route through
its neighbor Cogent AS 174. However, AS 5617’s secure
route is 5 hops long (right), significantly longer than the 2
hop route AS 5617 used prior to S*BGP deployment (left).
Thus, after S*BGP deployment AS 52142 learns a 6-hop
legitimate route through AS 5617, and a 5-hop bogus route.
Since AS 52142 is insecure, it chooses the shorter route, and
becomes unhappy as collateral damage.
Collateral damages. A source AS s /∈ S obtains collat-
eral damages from an S*BGP deployment S with respect to
an attacker m and destination d if (a) s was happy when the
ASes in T are secure, but (b) s is unhappy when the ASes
in S are secure, and S ⊃ T .
No collateral damages in the security 3rd model: The
collateral damage above occurs because AS 5617 prefers a
longer secure route over a shorter insecure route. This can
also happen in the security 1st model (but see also Ap-
pendix A), but not when security is 3rd. See Table 3.
Theorem 6.1. In the security 3rd model, if an AS s has a
route to a destination d that avoids an attacker m when the
set of secure ASes is S, then s has a route to a destination d
that avoids attacker m for every set of secure ASes in T ⊃ S.
The proof is in Appendix G. The security 3rd model is our
only monotone model; more secure ASes cannot result in
fewer happy ASes, so the metric HM,D(S) grows monotoni-
cally in S.
Fewer immune ASes as security becomes more im-
portant? Collateral damages also explain why the frac-
tion of immune ASes in the security 2nd model in Figure 3
is smaller than the number of happy ASes in the baseline
scenario (Section 4.4). This is because in the security 2nd
model, collateral damages mean that securing some ASes
can actually make other ASes more vulnerable to attack.
6.1.2 Collateral Benefits
Insecure ASes can also become happy as a collateral ben-
efit, because other ASes obtained secure routes:
Figure 14. We show how AS 5166, with the Department
of Defense Network Information Center, obtains collateral
benefits when its provider AS 174, Cogent, deploys S*BGP.
On the left, we show the network prior to the deployment
of S*BGP; focusing on Cogent AS 174, we see that it falls
victim to the attack, choosing a bogus route through its cus-
tomer AS 3491. As a result, AS 5166 routes to the attacker
as well. On the right, we show the network after S*BGP
deployment. Now, both AS 174 and AS 3491 are secure,
and choose a longer secure customer route to the legitimate
destination. As a result, AS 5166, which remains insecure,
becomes happy as a collateral benefit.
Collateral benefits. A source AS s /∈ S obtains collateral
benefits from an S*BGP deployment S with respect to an
attacker m and destination d if (a) s is unhappy when the
ASes in T are secure, but (b) s is happy when the ASes in
S are secure, and S ⊃ T .
Collateral benefits are possible in all three routing policy
models (Table 3). Here is an example when security is 3rd:
Figure 15. We show how AS34223, a Russian ISP, obtains
collateral benefits in the security 3rd model. The left subfig-
ure shows how AS34223 and and its provider AS3267 react
to the attack before S*BGP deployment; AS3267 learns two
peer routes of equal length – one bogus route to the at-
tacker m and one legitimate route to Pandora’s AS 40426.
AS3267 then tiebreaks in favor of the attacker, so both
5166
10310
40426
3257
m
20960
7922
5617 1743356
3491
52142
12389
NON MONTONICITY EXAMPLE, SECURITY SECOND (AS52142)
ALSO COLLATERAL BENEFIT, SECURITY SECOND (as5166)
Victim 40426 Pandora,  Attacker Iranian ISP 12880, tokens:  t2_100_cp_stub
5617 Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. Network Information.
NON M TONICITY EXAMPLE, SECURITY SECOND (AS52142)
ALSO COLLATERAL BENEFIT, SECURITY SECOND (as5166)
Victim 40426 Pandora,  Attacker Iranian ISP 12880, tokens:  t2_100_cp_stub
174 COGENT
5166
10310
40426
3257
m
20960
7922
5617 1743356
3491
52142
12389
Figure 14: Collateral benefits & damages; sec 2nd.
COLLATERAL BENEFITS EXAMPLE, SECURITY THIRD
Victim 40426 Pandora,  Attacker Iranian ISP 12880, tokens:  t2_100_cp_stub
10310 Yahoo!
12389 ROSTELECOM RUSSIA
34223 ZAO N‐REGION RUSSIA
3267  STATE INSTITUTE OF INFO TECH RUSSIA
10310
40426
3267
7922
34223
m
12389
COL ATERAL BENEFITS EXAMPLE, SECURITY THIRD
Victim 40426 Pandora,  Attacker Iranian ISP 12880, tokens:  t2_100_cp_stub
10310 Yahoo!
12389 ROSTELECOM RUSSIA
34223 ZAO N‐REGION RUSSIA
3267  STATE INSTITUTE OF INFO TECH RUSSIA
10310
40426
3267
7922
34223
m
12389
Figure 15: Collateral benefits; security 3rd.
AS3267 and his customer AS34 23 becom u happy. O the
right, we show what happens after partial S*BGP deploy-
ment. AS3267 has a secure route to Pandora of equal length
and type as the insecure route to m; so AS3267 chooses the
secure route, and his insecure customer AS34223 becomes
happy as a collateral benefit.
6.2 Root-cause analysis.
Which of the phenomena in Table 3 have the biggest im-
pact on security? We now check how these phenomena play
out in the last step of the Tier 1 & Tier 2 rollout of Sec-
tion 5.2.1. Recall that S is all 13 Tier 1s, all 100 Tier 2s and
all of their stubs, i.e., roughly 50% of the AS graph.
Figure 16 (left). We start with a root cause analysis for
the security 3rd model. Recall that Theorem 6.1 showed that
collateral damages do not occur in the security 3rd model,
and so we do not consider them here.
Changes in secure routes. We start with an analysis
similar to that of Section 5.3.1; The bottom three parts of
the bar show the fraction of secure routes available in normal
conditions, prior to any routing attacks. (Averaging is across
all V 2 sources and destinations.) During routing attacks,
these routes can be broken down into three types: (1) secure
routes lost to protocol downgrade attacks (lowest part of the
bar), (2) secure routes that are “wasted” on ASes that would
have been happy even in the absence of S*BGP (second
lowest part), and (3) secure routes that protected ASes that
were unhappy in the absence of S*BGP (third lowest part).
(Averaging is, as usual, over M ′ and D = V and all V source
ASes.) Importantly, improvements in our security metric
can only result from the small fraction of secure routes in
class (3); the remaining secure routes either (1) disappear
due to protocol downgrades, or (2) are “wasted” on ASes
that would have avoided the attack even without S*BGP.
Changes in the metric. The top two parts of the bar show
how (the lower bound on) the metric HM′,V (S) grows rela-
tive to the baseline scenario S = ∅ due to: (a) secure routes
in class (3), and (b) (the lower bound on) the fraction of in-
secure ASes that obtained collateral benefits. Figure 16(left)
thus illustrates the importance of collateral benefits.
Figure 16 (right). We perform the same analysis for the
security 1st model. By Theorem 3.1, protocol downgrade at-
tacks occur only rarely in this model, so these are not visible
in the figure. However, we now have to account for collateral
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Figure 16: Changes in the metric explained. Sec 3rd
(left) and Sec 1st (right).
damages (Section 6.1.1), which we depict with the smaller
sliver on right of the figure. We obtain the change in the
metric by subtracting the collateral damages from the gains
resulting from (a) offering secure routes to unhappy ASes
and (b) collateral benefits. Fortunately, we find collateral
damages to be a relatively rare phenomenon.
Fitting it all together? This analysis reveals that
changes in the metric can be computed as follows: (Secure
routes created under normal conditions) + (collateral ben-
efits) − (protocol downgrades) − (secure routes “wasted”
on ASes that are already happy) − (collateral damages).
We find that all of these phenomena (with the exception of
collateral damage) have significant impact on the security
metric. These observations also drive home the point that
the number of routes learned via S*BGP in normal condi-
tions is a poor proxy for the “security” of the network; more
sophisticated metrics like the ones we use here are required.
Results where security 2nd look very similar to results
when security is 3rd, with the addition of a small amount of
collateral damage. The bottom line is, when security is 2nd
or 3rd, (1) protocol downgrade attacks cause many secure
routes that were available under normal conditions to dis-
appear, and (2) those ASes that retain their secure routes
during the attack would have been happy even if S*BGP
had not been deployed; the result is meagre increases in the
security metric. Meanwhile, when security is 1st, few down-
grades occur, and the security metric is greatly improved.
7. RELATED WORK
Over the past decades several security extensions to BGP
have been proposed; see [10] for a survey. However, pro-
posals of new security extensions to BGP, and their subse-
quent security analyses typically assume that secure ASes
will never accept insecure routes [6,11], which is reasonable
in the full deployment scenario where every AS has already
deployed S*BGP [7,10,22]. There have also been studies on
incentives for S*BGP adoption [11,19]; these works suggest
that “S*BGP and BGP will coexist in the long term” [19],
which motivated our study of S*BGP in partial deployment.
The partial deployment scenarios we considered have been
suggested in practice [44] and in this literature [6, 11,19].
Our work is most closely related to [22], which also mea-
sures “security” as the fraction of source ASes that avoid
having their traffic intercepted by the attacking AS. How-
ever, [22] always assumes that the S*BGP variant is fully de-
ployed. Thus, as discussed in Section 4.2, [22] also finds that
fully-deployed origin authentication provides good security
against attack we studied here (i.e., announcing“m, d”using
insecure BGP, see Section 3.1), but rightly assumes this at-
tack fails against fully-deployed S*BGP. Moreover, [22] does
not analyze interactions between S*BGP and BGP that arise
during partial deployment (e.g., Table 3).
Finally, [8] includes cryptographic analysis of S*BGP in
partial deployment, and an Internet draft [27] mentions pro-
tocol downgrade attacks. However, neither explores how at-
tacks on partially-deployed S*BGP can impact routing, or
considers the number / type of ASes harmed by an attack.
8. CONCLUSION
On one hand, our results give rise to guidelines for partially-
deployed S*BGP: (1) Deploying lightweight simplex S*BGP
at stub ASes, instead of full-fledged S*BGP; this reduces de-
ployment complexity at the majority of ASes without com-
promising overall security. (2) Incorporating S*BGP into
routing policies in a similar fashion at all ASes, to avoid
introducing routing anomalies like BGP Wedgies. (3) De-
ploying S*BGP at Tier 2 ISPs, since deployments of S*BGP
at Tier 1s can do little to improve security. On the other
hand, we find that partially-deployed S*BGP provides, on
average, limited security benefits over route origin authen-
tication when ASes do not prioritize security 1st.
We hope that our work will call attention to the chal-
lenges that arise during partial deployment, and drive the
development of solutions that can help surmount them. One
idea is to find ways to limit protocol downgrade attacks, as
these cause many of our negative results. For example, one
could add “hysteresis” to S*BGP, so that an AS does not im-
mediately drop a secure route when “better” insecure route
appears. Alternatively, one could find deployment scenarios
that create “islands” of secure ASes that agree to prioritize
security 1st for routes between ASes in the island; the chal-
lenge is to do this without disrupting existing traffic engi-
neering or business arrangements. Other security solutions
could also be explored. For example, origin authentication
with anomaly detection and prefix filtering could be easier
to deploy (they can be based on the RPKI), and may be as
effective as partially-deployed S*BGP.
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APPENDIX
A. MORE COLLATERAL DAMAGE
Figure 14 revealed that collateral damages can be caused
by secure ASes that choose long secure paths. When security
is 1st, collateral damages can also be caused by secure ASes
that choose expensive secure paths:
Figure 17. We show how AS 4805, Orange Business
in Oceania, suffers from collateral damage when security
is 1st. On the left, we show the network prior to S*BGP
deployment. Orange Business AS4805 learns two routes:
a legitimate route through its peer Optus Communications
AS 7474, and a bogus route through its provider AS 2647.
Since AS 4805 prefers peer routes over provider routes per
our LP rule, it will choose the legitimate route and avoid the
attack. On the right, we show what happens after S*BGP
deployment. Now, Optus Communications AS 7474 has
started using a secure route. However, this secure route
is through its provider AS 7473. Observe that AS 7474 is
no longer willing to announce a route to its peer AS 4805
as this would violate the export policy Ex. AS 4805 is now
left with the bogus provider route through AS 2647, and
becomes unhappy as collateral damage.
B. COMPUTING ROUTING OUTCOMES
Below we present algorithms for computing S*BGP rout-
ing outcomes in the presence of an attacker (per Section 3.1),
in each of our three S*BGP routing models. These algo-
rithms receive as input an attacker-destination pair (m, d)
and the set of secure ASes S and output the S*BGP rout-
ing outcome (in each of our three S*BGP routing mod-
els). We point out that our algorithms can also be used
to compute routes during normal conditions (when there
is no attacker m = ∅), and when no AS is secure S =
∅. In these algorithms, which extend the algorithmic ap-
proach used in [19, 20, 22] to handle partial S*BGP deploy-
ment in the presence the adversary described in Section 3.1,
we carefully construct a partial two-rooted routing tree by
performing multi-stage breadth-first-search (BFS) computa-
tions with d and m as the two roots. We prove the correct-
ness of our algorithms (that is, that they indeed compute
the desired S*BGP routing outcomes) in Appendix B.5. In
subsequent sections, we show how to use these algorithms
to partition ASes into doomed/immune/protectable nodes,
to determine which ASes are happy, or experience protocol
downgrade attacks for a given (m, d)-pair and deployment
S.
B.1 Notation and preliminaries.
Since BGP (and S*BGP) sets up routes to each destina-
tion independently, we focus on routing to a unique desti-
nation d. We say that a route is legitimate if it does not
contain the attacker m (either because there is no attacker
m = ∅ or because the attacker is not on the route). We
say that a route is attacked otherwise. Observe that in the
presence of an attacker m launching the attack of Section 3,
all attacked routes have m as the first hop following d. We
use the following definition of “perceivable routes” from [36].
NON MONTONICITY EXAMPLE, SECURITY FIRST
Victim 40426 Pandora,  Attacker Iranian ISP 12880, tokens:  t2_100_cp_stub
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Figure 17: Collat ral damages; security 1st.
Definition B.1 (Perceivable routes). A simple (loop-
free) route R = {vi−1, . . . , v1, d} is perceivable at AS vi if
one of the two following conditions holds:
1. R is legitimate (so v1 6= m), and for every 0 < j < i it
follows that vj announcing the route (vj , . . . , d) to vj+1
does not violate Ex.
2. R is attacked (so v1 = m), and for every 1 < j < i it
follows that vj announcing the route (vj , . . . , d) to vj+1
does not violate Ex.
Intuitively, an AS’s set of perceivable routes captures all
the routes this AS could potentially learn during the S*BGP
convergence process. All non-perceivable routes from an AS
can safely be removed from consideration as the Ex condi-
tion ensures that they will not propagate from the destina-
tion/attacker to that AS.
We say that a route (vi−1, . . . , v1, d) is a customer route
if vi−1 is a customer of vi. We define peer routes and
provider routes analogously. We say that a route R =
{vi, vi−1, ..., v1, d} contains AS x, if at least one AS in {vi, vi−1, ..., v1, d}
is x.
PR and BPR sets. Let PR(vi,m, d) be the set of perceiv-
able routes from vi for the attacker-victim pair (m, d) when
attacker m attacks destination d using the attack described
in Section 3.1. (We set m = ∅ when there is no attacker.)
Given a set of secure ASes S, for every AS vi we define
the BPR(vi, S,m, d) to be the set of all perceivable routes in
PR(vi,m, d) that are preferred by vi over all other perceiv-
able routes, before the arbitrary tiebreak step TB, according
to the routing policy model (i.e., security 1st, 2nd, or 3rd)
under consideration. (Again, we set m = ∅ when there is no
attacker and S = ∅ when no ASes are secure). We define
Nxt(vi, S,m, d) to be the set of all neighbors of vi that are
next hops of all routes in BPR(vi, S,m, d). We will just use
Nxt(vi) when it is clear what S, m and d are.
Observe that in each of our models, all routes in BPR(vi, S,m, d)
must (1) belong to the same type—customer routes, peer
routes, or provider routes, (2) be of the same length, and
(3) either all be (entirely) secure or insecure.
B.2 Algorithm for security 3rd.
We now present our algorithm for computing the S*BGP
routing outcome in the security 3rd model in the presence
of a set of secure ASes S and an attacker m. We note that
this algorithm also serves to compute the routing outcome
when no ASes are secure, i.e., S = ∅. As in [36] (which
studies a somewhat different BGP routing model and does
not consider S*BGP) we exhibit an iterative algorithm Fix-
Routes (FR) that, informally, at each iteration fixes a single
AS’s route and adds that AS to a set I ⊆ V . This goes on
until all ASes are in I (that is, all ASes’ routes are fixed).
We will later prove that FR indeed outputs the BGP routing
outcome.
FR consists of three subroutines: Fix Customer Routes
(FCR), Fix Peer Routes (FPeeR), and Fix Provider
Routes (FPrvR), that FR executes in that order. Note that
at the very beginning of this algorithm, I contains only the
legitimate destination d and the attacker m (if there is an
attacker). We now describe FR and its subroutines.
Step I: The FCR subroutine. FR starts with FCR;
at this point I contains only the legitimate destination d
and the attacker m. Intuitively, FCR constructs a partial
two-rooted tree (rooted at d and m on the graph, using a
BFS computation in which only customer-to-provider edges
are traversed.Initially, d has path length 0 and m has path
length 1 (to capture the fact that m announces that it is
directly connected to d in the attack of Section 3.1).
We set PR0(vi) = PR(vi,m, d) and BPR
0(vi) = BPR(vi, S,m, d)
for every AS vi. We let r be the FR iteration and initialize
it to r := 0.
While there is an AS s /∈ I such that PRr−1(s) contains
at least one customer route, we “fix” the route of (at least)
one AS by executing the following steps:
1. r++;
2. Select the AS vi /∈ I that has the shortest customer
route in its set BPRr−1(vi) (if there are multiple such
ASes, choose one arbitrarily);
3. Add vi to I; set Nxt(vi) to be vi’s next-hop on the route
in BPRr−1(vi) selected according to its tie-breaking rule
TB;
4. Remove, for every AS vj , all routes in PR
r−1(vi) that
contain vi but whose suffix at vi is not in BPR
r−1(vi)
to obtain the new set PRr(vi); set BPR
r(vj) to be vj ’s
most preferred routes in PRr(vi)
5. Add all ASes vj such that PR
r(vi) = ∅ to I.
Step II: the FPeeR subroutine. This step starts with
I and the configuration of the routing system and the PR
and BPR sets the way it is after execution of FCR (all the
ASes discovered the FCR step have their route selections
locked), i.e., I contains only d, m, and ASes with either
empty or customer routes. We now use only single peer-to-
peer edges to connect new yet-unexplored ASes to the ASes
that were locked in the partial routing tree in the 1st stage
of the algorithm.
While there is an AS s /∈ I such that PRr−1(s) contains
at least one peer route, the following steps are executed:
1. r++
2. select an AS vi /∈ I;
3. add vi to I; set Nxt(vi) to be vi’s next-hop on the route
in BPRr−1(vi) selected according to its tie-breaking rule
TB;
4. remove, for every AS vj , all routes in PR
r−1(vi) that
contain vi but whose suffix at vi is not in BPR
r−1(vi)
to obtain the new set PRr(vi); set BPR
r(vj) to be vj ’s
most preferred routes in PRr(vi)
5. add all ASes vj such that PR
r(vi) = ∅ to I.
Step III: The FPrvR subroutine. We now run a BFS
computation in which only provider-to-customer edges are
traversed, that is, only ASes who are direct customer of
those ASes that have already been added to the partial two-
rooted tree are explored. This step starts with I and the
configuration of the routing system and the PR and BPR
sets the way it is after the consecutive execution of FCR
and FPeeR.
While there is an AS s /∈ I such that PRr−1(s) contains
at least one provider route, we execute the identical steps as
in FCR, with the exception that we look for the vi that has
the shortest provider route in its set BPRr−1(vi).
B.3 Algorithm for security 2nd.
Our algorithm for the security 2nd model is a refinement
of the iterative algorithm Fix Routes (FR) presented above
for the security 3rd model. This new algorithm is also a 3-
stage BFS in which customer routes are fixed before peer
routes, which are fixed before provider routes. In each stage
we are careful to prioritize ASes with secure routes over ASes
with insecure routes.
We present the following two new subroutines. (1) Fix
Secure Customer Routes (FSCR): FSCR is identical to
FCR, with the sole exception that for the AS chosen at
each iteration r has a BPRr−1 that contains a secure cus-
tomer route; (2) Fix Secure Provider Routes (FSPrvR):
FSPrvR is identical to FPrvR, with the sole exception that
for the AS chosen at each iteration r has a BPRr−1 that
contains a secure provider route. The variant of FR for the
security 3rd model executes the subroutines the following
order:
1. FSCR
2. FCR
3. FPeeR
4. FSPrvR
5. FPrvR
B.4 Algorithm for security 1st.
Once again, we present a variant of the Fix Routes (FR)
algorithm. This multi-stage BFS computation first discovers
all ASes that can reach the destination d via secure routes
and only then discovers all other ASes (as in our algorithm
for the security 3rd model).
We present the following new subroutine. Fix Secure
Peer Routes (FSPeeR): FSPeeR is identical to FSPeeR,
except that the AS chosen at each iteration r has a secure
peer route in its BPRr−1 set. This variant of FR executes
the subroutines in the following order:
1. FSCR
2. FSPeeR
3. FSPrV
4. FCR
5. FPeeR
6. FPrvR
B.5 Correctness of Algorithms
We now prove that that our algorithms for computing
the S*BGP routing outcomes indeed output the desired out-
come.
B.5.1 Correctness of algorithm for security 3rd.
The proof that our algorithm for the security 3rd model
outputs the S*BGP routing outcome in this model follows
from the combination of the lemmas below. Recall that each
of our algorithms computes, for every AS vi, a next-hop AS
Nxt(vi). Let Rvi be the route from vi induced by these
computed next-hops.
Lemma B.2. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FCR is guaranteed to stabilize to the route
Rvi .
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the FCR
iteration. Consider the first iteration. Observe that the AS
chosen at this iteration of FCR must be a direct provider
of d (that is, have a customer route of length 1). Hence, in
the security 3rd model, once this AS learns of d’s existence
it will select the direct route to d and never choose a dif-
ferent route thereafter (as this is its most preferred route).
Now, let us assume that for every AS chosen in iterations
1, . . . , r the statement of the lemma holds. Let vi be the
AS chosen at iteration r + 1 of FCR. Consider vi’s BPR set
at that time. By definition, every route in the BPR set is
perceivable and so must comply with Ex at each and every
“hop” along the route. Notice, that this, combined with the
fact that all routes in vi’s BPR set are customer routes, im-
plies that the suffix of every such route is also a perceivable
customer route. Consider an AS vj that is vi’s next-hop on
some route in vi’s BPR set. Notice that vj ’s route is fixed at
some iteration in {1, . . . , r} (as vj has a shorter perceivable
customer route than vi). Hence, by the induction hypoth-
esis, at some point in the S*BGP convergence process, vj ’s
route converges to Rvj for every such AS vj . Observe that,
from that point in time onward, vi’s best available routes are
precisely those capture by BPR in the r + 1’th iteration of
FCR. Hence, from that moment onwards vi will repeatedly
select the route Rvi according to the tiebreak step TB and
never select a different route thereafter.
Lemma B.3. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FPeeR is guaranteed to stabilize to the
route Rvi .
Proof. Consider an AS vi chosen at some iteration of
FPeeR. Observe if (vi, vi−1, . . . , d) is a perceivable peer route
then (vi−1, . . . , d) must be a perceivable customer route (to
satisfy the Ex condition). Hence, for every such route in vi’s
BPR set it must be the case that the route of vi’s next-hop on
this route vj was fixed in FCR. By Lemma B.2, at some point
in the S*BGP convergence process, vj ’s route converges to
Rvj for every such AS vj . Observe that, from that point in
time onward, vi’s best available routes are precisely those
capture by its BPR set at the iteration of FPeeR in which
vi is chosen. Hence, vi will select the route Rvi according
to the tiebreak step TB and never select a different route
thereafter.
Lemma B.4. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FPrvR is guaranteed to stabilize to the
route Rvi .
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the number
of FPrvR iterations. Consider the first iteration. Let vi be
the AS chosen at this iteration, let vj be a next-hop of vi on
some route R in vi’s BPR set, and let Q be the suffix of R
at vj . Observe that Q cannot possibly be a provider route,
for otherwise vj would have been chosen in FPrvR before
vi. Hence, Q must be either a customer route or a peer
route, and so vj ’s route must have been fixed in either FCR
or FPeeR. Hence, by the previous lemmas, under S*BGP
convergence, every such vj ’s route will eventually converge
to Rvj . Observe that once all such ASes’ routes have con-
verged and onwards vi’s best available routes are precisely
those captured by BPR in the r + 1’th iteration of FPrvR.
Hence, vi will select the route Rvi according to the tiebreak
step TB and never select a different route thereafter.
Now, let us assume that for every AS chosen in iterations
1, ..., r the statement of the lemma holds. Let vi be the AS
chosen at iteration r + 1 of FPrvR and consider vi’s BPR
set at this time. Let vj again be a next-hop of of vi on
some route R in vi’s BPR set, and let Q be the suffix of R
at vj . Observe that if Q is a provider route then vj ’s route
must have been fixed in FPrvR at some point in iterations
{1, . . . , r}. If, however, Q is either a customer route or a
peer route vj ’s route must have been fixed in either FCR or
FPeeR. Hence, by the previous lemmas and the induction
hypothesis, under S*BGP convergence, every such vj ’s route
will eventually converge to Rvj . From that moment onwards
vi’s best available routes are precisely those captured by
BPR in the r+ 1’th iteration of FprvR. Hence, vi will select
the route Rvi according to the tiebreak step TB and never
select a different route thereafter.
B.5.2 Correctness of algorithm for security 2nd.
The proof that our algorithm for the security 2nd model
outputs the S*BGP routing outcome in this model follows
from the combination of the lemmas below. Let Rvi be the
route from vi induced by the algorithm’s computed next-
hops.
Lemma B.5. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FSCR is guaranteed to stabilize to the
route Rvi .
Proof. The proof is essentially the proof of Lemma B.2
(where now all routes must be secure).
Lemma B.6. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FCR is guaranteed to stabilize to the route
Rvi .
Proof. As in proof of Lemma B.2, this lemma is proved
via induction on the FCR iteration. Consider the first itera-
tion. Let vi be the AS chosen at this iteration and let vj be
a next-hop on a route in vi’s BPR set. Observe that it must
be that either vj = d or vj ’s route was fixed in FSCR (for
otherwise, vj would have been selected in FCR before vi).
Hence, Lemma B.5 (and the fact that d’s route is trivially
fixed) implies that under S*BGP convergence each such vj ’s
route will stabilize at some point and from that point on-
wards vi will repeatedly select Rvi (see similar argument in
Lemma B.2). Now, let us assume that for every AS chosen
in iterations 1, . . . , r the statement of the lemma holds. Let
vi be the AS chosen at iteration r+ 1 of FCR. Consider vi’s
BPR set at that time and consider again an AS vj that is
vi’s next-hop on some route in vi’s BPR set. Notice that vj ’s
route must either have been fixed in FCR at some iteration
in {1, . . . , r} (if vj has a shorter perceivable customer route
than vi) or in FSCR (if vj has a secure customer route to
d). Hence, by the induction hypothesis, at some point in the
S*BGP convergence process, vj ’s route converges to Rvj for
every such AS vj . As before, from that point in time onward
vi will repeatedly select Rvi .
Lemma B.7. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FPeeR is guaranteed to stabilize to the
route Rvi .
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma B.3.
Lemma B.8. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FSPrvR is guaranteed to stabilize to the
route Rvi .
Proof. The proof is essentially the proof of Lemma B.4
(where now all routes must be secure).
Lemma B.9. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FPrvR is guaranteed to stabilize to the
route Rvi .
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma B.2, we prove this
lemma by induction on the number of FPrvR iterations.
Consider the first iteration. Let vi be the AS chosen at this
iteration, let vj be a next-hop of vi on some route R in vi’s
BPR set, and let Q be the suffix of R at vj . Observe that
either Q is a customer/peer route, in which case vj ’s route
was fixed before FSPrvR or Q is a secure provider route, in
which case vj ’s route was fixed in FSPrvR. We can now use
Lemma B.8 and an argument similar to that in the proof of
Lemma B.2 to conclude that vi’s route will indeed converge
to Rvi at some point in the S*BGP routing process.
Now, let us assume that for every AS chosen in iterations
1, ..., r the statement of the lemma holds. Let vi be the AS
chosen at iteration r+1 of FPrvR and consider vi’s BPR set
at this time. Let vj again be a next-hop of of vi on some
route R in vi’s BPR set, and let Q be the suffix of R at vj .
Observe that if Q is a provider route then vj ’s route must
have been fixed in either FSPrvR or in FPrvR at some point
in iterations {1, . . . , r}. If, however, Q is either a customer
route or a peer route vj ’s route must have been fixed in
either FCR or FPeeR. Hence, by the previous lemmas and
the induction hypothesis, under S*BGP convergence, every
such vj ’s route will eventually converge to Rvj . Again, we
can conclude that vi’s route too will converge to Rvi .
B.5.3 Correctness of algorithm for security 1st.
The proof that our algorithm for the security 1st model
outputs the S*BGP routing outcome in this model follows
from the combination of the lemmas below (whose proofs is
almost identical to the proof for the other two models and
is therefore omitted). Again, let Rvi be the route from vi
induced by the algorithm’s computed next-hops.
Lemma B.10. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FSCR is guaranteed to stabilize to the route
Rvi .
Lemma B.11. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FSPeeR is guaranteed to stabilize to the
route Rvi .
Lemma B.12. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FSPrvR is guaranteed to stabilize to the
route Rvi .
Lemma B.13. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FCR is guaranteed to stabilize to the route
Rvi .
Lemma B.14. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FPeeR is guaranteed to stabilize to the
route Rvi .
Lemma B.15. Under S*BGP routing, the route of every
AS added to I in FPrvR is guaranteed to stabilize to the
route Rvi .
C. BOUNDS ON HAPPY ASES.
We use the three algorithms in Appendix B.2-B.4 to com-
pute upper and lower bounds on the set of happy ASes (as
discussed in Section 4.1), for a given attacker-destination
pair (m, d), set of secure ASes S and routing model. To
do this, each algorithm records, for every AS discovered in
the BFS computation, whether (1) all routes in its BPR at
that iteration lead to the destination, or (2) all these routes
lead to the attacker or (3) some of these routes lead to the
destination and others to the attacker. The number of ASes
in the 1st category is then set to be a lower bound on the
number of happy ASes. The total number of ASes in the 1st
and 3rd category is set to be an upper bound on the number
of happy ASes.
The correctness of this approach follows from the correct-
ness of our algorithms (Appendix B.5), and the fact that all
the routes in the BPRr(vi) of a node vi at iteration r have the
same length, type, and are either all secure or insecure, so
the TB criteria completely determines which of these routes
are chosen. As such, ASes in the 1st category choose legiti-
mate routes (and are happy) regardless of the TB criteria,
ASes in the 2nd category choose attacked routes (and are
unhappy) regardless of the TB criteria, and whether ASes
in the 3rd category are happy completely depends on the
TB criteria.
D. BGP CONVERGENCE.
Taken together, Lemmas B.2-B.15 proven in Appendix B.5
above imply Theorem 2.1; that is, when all ASes prioritize
secure routes the same way, convergence to a single stable
routing state is guaranteed, regardless of which ASes adopt
S*BGP, even in presence of attacks discussed in Section 3.
E. PARTITIONS.
Recall from Section 4.3.1 that a source AS s is protectable
if S*BGP can affect whether or not it routes to the legit-
imate destination d or the attacker m; the source AS s is
doomed (resp. immune) if it always routes to the attacker
m (resp. routes to the legitimate destination d), regardless
of how S*BGP is deployed in the network. In the security
1st model all ASes are assumed to be protectable (we do
this to avoid the complications discussed in Appendix E.3).
In this section we describe how we compute the sets of im-
mune, doomed, and protectable ASes with respect to an
attacker-destination pair (m, d) in the security 2nd and 3rd
models. To do this, we set S = ∅ and compute the BGP
routing outcome for that (m, d) pair using the algorithm in
Section B.2.
E.1 Computing partitions: security 3rd
To determine the partitions for the security 3rd model,
this algorithm records, for every AS discovered in the BFS
computation whether (1) all routes in its BPR set at that
iteration lead to the destination, or (2) all these routes lead
to the attacker or (3) some of these routes lead to the des-
tination and others to the attacker. We classify ASes in
the 1st category as immune, ASes in the 2nd category as
doomed, and ASes in the 3rd category as protectable. We
show below that this indeed coincides with our definitions
of immune, doomed, and protectable ASes in Section 4.3.1
for the security 3rd model.
The following allows us to prove the correctness of our
algorithm for computing partitions:
Corollary E.1. In the security 3rd routing model, for
any destination d, attacker m, source s and deployment S ⊆
V , s will stabilize to a route of the same type and length as
any route in BR(s, ∅,m, d).
Proof. This follows from the correctness of our algo-
rithm for computing routes in the security 3rd model (Ap-
pendix B.2). Note that because in the security 3rd model
route security is prioritized below path length, all routes
in BPRr(s) must be contained in BPR(s, ∅,m, d), where
BPRr(s) is the set of best perceivable routes of s during
iteration r of the subroutine FCR, FPeeR or FPrvR of our
algorithm, when BPR(s, S,m, d) contains customer, peer or
provider routes respectively. Recognize that by the correct-
ness of our algorithm, s must stabilize to a route in BPRr(s)
for some iteration r of exactly one of these subroutines.
Therefore, any s that has customer routes in BPR(s, ∅,m, d)
will be “fixed” to a route in the FCR subroutine for any
choice of S. Similarly, if s has peer (resp., provider) routes
in BPR(s, ∅,m, d), it will be “fixed” to a route in the FPeeR
(resp., FPrvR) subroutine for any choice of S. Therefore,
the type of the route will be fixed to the same type as that
of the BPR(s, ∅,m, d) for all S. Moreover, when we choose
to “fix” the route of s in the appropriate subroutine, we do
so by selecting s with a shortest routes out of all the sources
that have not been“fixed”, and regardless of S, and it follows
the the length of the route will be the same for all S.
Corollary E.1 tells us that for determining whether s is
immune, doomed or protectable in security 3rd model, it is
sufficient to keep track of all the routes of the best type and
shortest length of s (i.e. all the routes in BPR(s, ∅,m, d)),
because s is guaranteed to stabilize to one of these routes.
Therefore, if all such routes are legitimate (resp., attacked),
then s will always stabilize to a legitimate (resp., attacked)
route under any S*BGP deployment S, so s must be im-
mune (resp., doomed). However, if some of these routes are
legitimate and some are attacked, then whether s stabilizes
to a route to m or d depends on deployment S, so s must
be protectable.
E.2 Computing partitions: security 2nd
The algorithm for determining partitions for the security
2nd model is slightly different from that used when security is
third. We still use the algorithm from Appendix B.2, except
that now, for every AS discovered in the BFS computation
we need to keep track of all perceivable routes in its PR
set that are of the same type as the routes in its BPR set.
We keep track of whether (1) all such routes lead to the
destination, or (2) all such routes lead to the attacker or (3)
some of these routes lead to the destination and others to the
attacker. We classify ASes in the 1st category as immune,
ASes in the 2nd category as doomed, and ASes in the 3rd
category as protectable.
The following allows us to prove the correctness of this
algorithm:
Corollary E.2. In the security 2nd routing model, for
any destination d, attacker m source s and deployment S ⊆
V , s will stabilize to a route of the same type as any route
in BPR(s, ∅,m, d).
Proof. This follows from the correctness of our algo-
rithm for computing routes in the security 2nd model (Ap-
pendix B.3). Because in the security 2nd model security is
prioritized above route length, but below route type, all the
routes in BPR(s)r must be contained in the set of routes in
PR(s,m, d) that are of the same type as routes in BPR(s, ∅,m, d).
Recall that BPRr(s) is the set of best perceivable routes of
s during iteration r of the appropriate subroutines FSCR
and FCR, FPeeR, or FSPrvR and FPrvR of our algorithm,
if BPR(s, S,m, d) contains customer, peer or provider routes
respectively. Also, note that by the correctness of our al-
gorithm, s must stabilize to a route in BPRr(s) for some
iteration r of exactly one of these subroutines.
Therefore, if s has customer routes in BPR(s, ∅,m, d), it
will be “fixed” to a route during either the FSCR or FCR
subroutines of this algorithm for any choice of S. If s has
peer routes in BPR(s, ∅,m, d), it will be “fixed” to a route
in the FPeeR subroutine for any choice of S. Finally, if s
has provider routes in BPR(s, ∅,m, d), it will be “fixed” to a
route in either FSPrvR or FPrvR subroutines for any choice
of S.
Corollary E.2 tells us that to determine if s is immune,
doomed or protectable in security 2nd model, it is sufficient
to keep track of all the routes of the best type of s (i.e.,
. all s’s perceivable routes of the same type as routes in
BPR(s, ∅,m, d)), because s is guaranteed to stabilize to one
of these routes. Therefore, if all such perceivable routes are
legitimate (resp., attacked) , then s must stabilize to a legit-
imate (resp., attacked) route under any S*BGP deployment
S, so s must be immune (resp., doomed). However, if some
of these routes are legitimate and some are attacked, then
whether s stabilizes to a route to m or d depends on deploy-
ment S, so s must be protectable.
E.3 Computing partitions: security 1st
In this paper we assume that all source ASes are pro-
tectable in security 1st model (see e.g., Figure 3). Techni-
cally, however, there can be doomed and immune ASes in
the security 1st model, in a few exceptional cases; here we
argue the the number of such ASes is negligible.
Doomed ASes. We can characterize doomed ASes as
follows.
Observation E.3. In the security 1st model, for a par-
ticular destination-attacker pair (d,m), a source AS vi is
doomed if and only if every one of its perceivable routes
PR(vi,m, d) contains m.
If every perceivable route from vi to d contains m, then
there is no S*BGP deployment scenario that could result
in vi being happy. On the other hand, if vi is not doomed,
then there must be at least one S*BGP deployment scenario
that results in vi being happy, in which case vi must select
a route to d that does not contain m.
ASes that single-homed to the attacking AS m are cer-
tainly doomed, per Observation E.4. There are 11, 953 and
11, 585 single-homed stub ASes (without peers) for the reg-
ular and the IXP-augmented graphs respectively. As an up-
per bound, we consider only the former number. Recall from
Section 4.1 that our security metric is an average of happy
sources, where the average is taken over all sources and all
appropriate destination-attacker pairs. It follows that that
for any one destination, there can be at most 11, 953 doomed
single-homed ASes when summed over all attackers and all
sources. Therefore, the fraction of doomed sources does not
exceed .001% and .01% when considering all and only non-
stub attackers respectively. While Observation E.4 suggests
there could be other doomed nodes (other than the just the
single-homed stub ASes), however, the Internet graph is suf-
ficiently well-connected to ensure that the number of such
ASes is small.
Immune ASes. A similar characterization is possible for
immune ASes.
Observation E.4. In the security 1st model, for a par-
ticular destination-attacker pair (d,m), a source AS vi is
immune if every one of its perceivable routes PR(vi, ∅,m)
contains d.
As we discussed above, immune ASes tend to be single-
homed stub ASes.
F. PROTOCOL DOWNGRADE ATTACKS.
In Section 3.2 we discussed how protocol downgrades can
occur in the security 2nd and 3rd model. We now prove
Theorem 3.1, that shows that protocol downgrade attacks
are avoided in the security 1st model; that is, every AS s
that uses a secure route that does not contain the attacker
m under normal conditions, will continue to use that secure
route when m launches its attack.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The theorem follows from the
correctness of the algorithm in Appendix B.4 for comput-
ing routes when security is 1st. Suppose the set of secure
routes is S. Consider an AS s who has its secure route Rs
fixed during the FSCR, FSPeerR, FSPrR subroutine of the
algorithm in Appendix B.4 when the set of secure ASes is S
and the attacker is m = ∅ (i.e., during normal conditions,
when there is no attack). If Rs does not contain m, then
s will have its route fixed to exactly the same secure route
Rs during the FSCR, FSPeeR, FSPrvR subroutine of the
algorithm in Appendix B.4 when the set of secure ASes is S
and m attacks. This follows because all routes that contain
m must be fixed after the FSCR, FSPeeR, FSPrvR portions
of the algorithm (since, by definition, all routes containing
m must be insecure during m’s attack). An inductive argu-
ment shows that all ASes on route Rs will therefore be fixed
to the same route that they used in normal conditions, and
the theorem follows.
F.1 Computing protocol downgrades.
To quantify the success of protocol downgrade attacks
with respect to an attacker-destination pair (m, d) and a set
of secure ASes S, we need to first establish which ASes have
a secure route to the destination under normal conditions,
that is, when there is no attack. To do this, we compute the
S*BGP routing outcome when there is no attacker (setting
m = ∅ for the set S) for the specific model under consid-
eration. The algorithm records for every AS discovered in
this BFS computation whether (1) all routes in its BPR set
at that iteration is secure or (2) all these routes are inse-
cure. We then compute the S*BGP routing outcome for
the pair (m, d) for the set S (for the specific model under
consideration)). Again, the algorithm records for every AS
discovered in this BFS computation whether (1) all routes
in its BPR set at that iteration are secure or (2) all these
routes are insecure. We conclude that a protocol-downgrade
attack against an AS is successful if that AS falls in the 1st
category in the first of these computations and in the 2nd
category in the second computation. The correctness of this
approach follows from the correctness of our algorithms in
Appendix B.
G. MONOTONICITY
In Section 6.1 and Appendix A we showed that collateral
damage is possible in the security 2nd and 1st models. We
now prove Theorem 6.1 that shows that collateral damage
does not occur in the security 3rd model; that is, for any des-
tination d, attacker m, source s and S*BGP deployments T
and S ⊆ T , if s stabilizes to a legitimate route in deployment
S, then s stabilizes to a legitimate route in deployment T .
Proof of Theorem 6.1. The theorem follows from the
correctness of our algorithm for computing routing outcomes
when security is 3rd (Appendix B.2). First, an inductive ar-
gument shows that every AS s that the algorithm“fixes”to a
secure route in deployment S is also “fixed” to a secure route
in T ; it follows that all such ASes stabilize to a legitimate
route in both S and T . Next we argue that every AS s that
the algorithm “fixes” to an insecure legitimate route in S is
also fixed to a legitimate route in T . There are two cases:
(a) if s is fixed to a secure route in T , it uses a legitimate
route, (b) otherwise, an inductive argument shows that the
algorithm computes the same next hop Nxt(s) for s in both
deployments T and S, and since the route was legitimate in
S, it will be legitimate in T as well.
H. SIMULATIONS
Our simulations compute the following for each destina-
tion d:
1. The S*BGP routing outcome for each of our 3 S*BGP
routing models and for every deployment set S consid-
ered in the paper (to enable computations that quantify
protocol downgrade attacks );
2. The BGP routing outcome with respect to every possi-
ble pair (m, d) and with S = ∅ (to compute partitions
into doomed/immune/protectable ASes, and to deter-
mine which ASes where happy in the baseline scenario
where S = ∅);
3. The S*BGP routing outcome for every possible (m, d)
in each of our 3 S*BGP routing models and for every
deployment set S considered in the paper (to compute
the happy ASes, to detect phenomena like collateral
benefits and damages, and as part of computations that
quantify protocol downgrade attacks );
To do this, we use the algorithms in Appendix B.2-B.4,
where the we execute the FCR, FSCR, FPeeR, FSPeeR,
FPrvR, and FSPrvR subroutines using breath-first searches.
The overall complexity of our simulations is thereforeO(|M ||D|(|V |+
|E|) for each deployment S. We optimize the running time
of our simulations in two ways:
Re-using information. Instead of running multiple com-
putations “from scratch” our simulations often re-use infor-
mation and pass it on from one computation to the next
(e.g., an AS that is doomed with respect to a specific attacker-
destination pair (m, d) will not route to d regardless of the
deployment scenario S, etc.).
Parallelization. We run these computations in parallel
across all destinations d. Our code was written in C++ and
en
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Figure 18: Reduction
parallelization was achieved with MPI on a BlueGene and
Blacklight supercomputers.
I. HARDNESS RESULTS
We prove Theorem 5.1, that shows that the“Max-k-Security”
problem is NP-hard in each of our three routing models.
Recall from Section 5.1, in the “Max-k-Security” problem,
we are given an AS graph, G = (V,E), a specific attacker-
destination pair (m, d), and a parameter k > 0, find a set of
ASes S of size k that maximizes the total number of happy
ASes.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we consider a slightly different
problem that we will call the “Decisional-k-`-Security” prob-
lem (Dk`SP): Given an AS graph, a specific attacker-destination
pair (m, d), and parameters k > 0 and 1 ≤ ` ≤ |V |, deter-
mine if there is a set of secure ASes S of size k that results
in at least ` happy ASes. Notice that this problem is in NP
(since we can check the number of happy ASes in polynomial
time given the algorithms discussed in Appendix B) and is
certainly poly-time reducible to “Max-k-Security”. There-
fore, the following theorem implies Theorem 5.1:
Theorem I.1. Dk`SP is NP-Complete in each of our three
routing policy models.
Proof. We present a poly-time reduction from the Set
Cover Decisional Problem (SCDP). In SCDP, we are given
a set N with n elements, a family F of w subsets of N and
an integer γ ≤ w, and we must decide if there exist γ subsets
in the family F that can cover all the elements in N .
Our reduction is shown in Figure 18. For each element
ei ∈ N in the SCDP instance, we create an AS ei in our
Dk`SP instance and connect it to the attacker via a provider-
to-customer edge. For each subset sj ∈ F , we create an AS
sj in our our Dk`SP instance and connect it to the desti-
nation d via a provider-to-customer edge. We connect AS
ei to AS sj via a provider-to-customer edge if ei ∈ sj in
the SCDP problem. Moreover, we require that every ei’s
has a tiebreak criteria TB that prefers the route through m
over any route through any sj . Notice that the perceivable
routes at every ei are of the same length and type; namely,
two-hop customer routes. Finally, we let ` = n+w+ 1, and
let k = n+ γ + 1.
Suppose that our SCDP instance has a γ-cover. We argue
that this implies that our corresponding Dk`SP should be
able to choose a set S of k secure ASes that ensure that
at least ` ASes are happy. The following set S of secure
ASes suffice: S = {d, e1, ..., en} ∪ {sj |sj is in the γ cover}.
Notice that S is of size k = n+ γ + 1, and results in exactly
` = n+w+ 1 happy ASes. (This follows because d is happy
by definition, all the set ASes s1, ..., sw are happy regardless
of the choice of S, and all the element ASes e1, ..., en choose
legitimate routes to the destination because they have secure
routes to d by construction.)
On the other hand, suppose we are able to secure exactly
k ASes while ensuring that ` ASes are happy. First, note
that all the set ASes s1, ..., sw and the destination AS and
are immune; they are happy regardless of which ASes are
secure. Next, note that if any of the n element ASes e1, ..., en
are insecure, then by construction it will choose a route to
the attacker and be unhappy, and we will have less than `
happy nodes. Similarly, if the destination d is insecure, by
construction all of the element ASes will choose an insecure
route to the attacker. Thus, if we secure all the element
ASes and the destination, we have k − 1− n = γ remaining
ASes to secure; by construction, these must be distributed
amongst the set ASes, and thus we will have a γ-cover by
construction.
Finally, note that this result holds in all three secure rout-
ing models; the reduction is agonistic to how ASes rank secu-
rity in their route preference decisions, since the perceivable
routes at every element AS ei have the same length and
type.
To extend this result to multiple destinations D and at-
tackers M , we can show the hardness of the following vari-
ant of the “Max-k-Security” problem: given G(V,E), sets
M,D ⊆ V and an integer k, the objective is to maximize
the average number of happy ASes across all (m, d) pairs in
M×D. The argument is the same as the above, except that
now we create multiple copies of the m and d nodes (and
their adjacent edges) in Figure 18, and let M be the copies
of the m nodes and D be the copies of the d nodes.
J. THE IXP-AUGMENTED GRAPH
We repeated our experiments on the IXP-augmented graph
described in Section 2.2 to obtain the following results.
J.1 Plots for Section 4.
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Figure 19: Plots for Section 4, IXP-augmented
graph. (a) Partitions. (b) Partitions by destina-
tion tier. Sec 3rd. (c) Partitions by destination tier.
Sec 2nd. (d) Partitions by attacker tier. Sec 3rd.
J.2 Plots for Section 5.
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Figure 20: Plots for Section 5, IXP-augmented
graph. For each plot, the x-axis is the number of
non-stub, non-CP ASes in S and the “error bars”
are explained in Section 5.3.2. (a) Tier 1+2 rollout:
For each step S in rollout, upper and lower bounds
on HM′,V (S) − HM′,V (∅). (b) Tier 1+2+CP rollout:
HM′,CP (S)−HM′,C(∅) for each step in the rollout. (c)
Tier 2 rollout: HM′,D(S) −HM′,D(∅) for each step in
the T2 rollout.
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Figure 21: Plot for Section 5, IXP-augmented
graph. What happens to secure routes to each CP
destination during attack. S is the Tier 1s, the CPs,
and all their stubs and security is 3rd.
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Figure 22: Plot2 for Section 5, IXP-augmented
graph. Non-decreasing sequence of HM′,d(S) −
HM′,d(∅) ∀ d ∈ S. (a) S is all T1s, T2s, and their
stubs. (b) S is all T2s and their stubs. (c) S is all
non stubs.
J.3 Plots for Section 6.
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Figure 23: Plots for Section 6, IXP-augmented
graph. Changes in the metric explained. Sec 3rd
(top) and Sec 1st (bottom).
K. SENSITIVITY TO ROUTING POLICY
Thus far, all our analysis has worked within the model of
local preference (LP) presented in Section 2.2.1. While the
survey of [18] found that 80% of network operators do prefer
customer routes over peer and provider routes, there are
some exceptions to this rule. Therefore, in this Appendix we
investigate alternate models of local preference, and consider
how they impact the results we presented in Section 4; we are
currently in the process of extending this sensitivity analysis
to the results in Section 5-6.
K.1 An alternate model of local preference.
All our results thus far have used the following model of
local preference:
Local pref (LP): Prefer customer routes over peer routes.
Prefer peer routes over provider routes.
However, [18] also found some instances where ASes, es-
pecially content providers, prefer shorter peer routes over
longer customer routes. For this reason, we now investigate
the following model of local preference:
Local pref (LPk): Paths are ranked as follows:
• Customer routes of length 1.
• Peer routes of length 1.
• ...
• Customer routes of length k.
• Peer routes of length k.
• Customer paths of length > k.
• Peer paths of length > k.
• Provider paths.
Following the LPk step, we have the SP and TB steps as
in Section 2.2.1. As before, the security 1st model ranks
SecP above LPk, the security 2nd model ranks SecP be-
tween LPk and SP, and the security 3rd model ranks SecP
between SP and TB.
Remark. We will study this policy variant for various
values of k; note that letting k → ∞ is equivalent a rout-
ing policy where ASes equally prefer customer and provider
routes, as follows:
• Prefer peer and customer routes over provider routes.
• Prefer shorter routes over longer routes.
• Break ties in favor of customer routes.
• Use intradomain criteria (e.g., geographic location, de-
vice ID) to break ties among remaining routes.
K.2 Results with LP2 policy variant.
We start with an analysis of the LP2 policy variant; we are
in process of extending these results to other LPk variants.
Here, a peer route of length less than or equal to 2 hops is
preferred over a longer customer route.
Partitions. In Figure 24 we show the partitions for
the LP2 policy variants, for the UCLA graph and for the
IXP augmented graph (cf., Figure 3 and Section 4.4). The
thick solid horizontal line shows the fraction of happy source
ASes in the baseline scenario (where no AS is secure). As
in Section 4.4, we find that with security 3rd only limited
improved improvements in the metric HV,V (S) are possible,
relative to the baseline scenario HV,V (∅); 82 − 71 = 11%
for the UCLA AS graph, and 88 − 72 = 13% for the IXP
augmented graph, both of which are slightly less than what
we saw for our original LP model. In the security 2nd model,
we again see better improvements than security 3rd, but
Sec 1st Sec 2nd Sec 3rdAv
e
ra
ge
 F
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 S
ou
rc
es
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
Doomed
Protectable
Immune
(a)
Sec 1st Sec 2nd Sec 3rdAv
e
ra
ge
 F
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 S
ou
rc
es
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
Doomed
Protectable
Immune
(b)
Figure 24: Partitions for the LP2 policy variant, (a)
UCLA graph (b) IXP-augmented graph.
not quite as much as we saw with our original LP model;
92− 71 = 21% for the UCLA AS graph, and 94− 72 = 22%
for the IXP augmented graph. Interestingly, however, we
do see one difference between the UCLA AS graph and the
IXP augmented graph in this model; namely, we see more
immune ASes when security is 2nd for the IXP augmented
graph (41% vs. 55%). We discuss the observation in more
detail shortly.
Partitions by destination tier. In Figure 25 we show
the partitions broken down by destination tier (see Table 1)
when security is 2nd and 3rd for the LP2 policy variants, for
the UCLA graph and for the IXP augmented graph (cf., Fig-
ure 4, Figure 5 and Section 4.5). The thick solid horizontal
line shows the fraction of happy source ASes in the baseline
scenario (where no AS is secure) for each destination tier.
While in Section 4.5 we found that most destination tiers
have roughly the same number of protectable ASes here we
see slightly different trends.
1. Most of the protectable nodes are at stub and SMDG
(low-degree non-stub ASes) destinations. The higher-degree
AS destinations, i.e., Tier 2s, Tier 2s, and CPs, have very
few protectable ASes but many more immune ASes as com-
pared to the results we obtained for our original LP model
in Figure 4. This is even more apparent for the IXP aug-
mented graph in the LP2 model.
Why is it that high-degree destinations do not require pro-
tection from S*BGP in the LP2 model? Consider a source
AS s that has a long (> 2 hop) customer route and short
(≤ 2 hop) peer route to the destination d. In LP2, s will
chose the short peer route, so an attacker m that wishes to
attract traffic from s must be exactly one hop away from
s (so that he can announce the bogus two-hop path “m, d”
directly to s, that s will prefer if m is his customer, or if
m is a peer that is preferred according to his tiebreak rule).
When m is not one hop away from s, s is immune. Since m
is unlikely to be exactly one-hop away from every source AS
that prefers a short peer route in LP2 over a long customer
route that it would have used in our original routing pol-
icy model, we see more immune nodes on average in LP2.
This effect is stronger on the IXP-augmented graph because
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Figure 25: Partitions by destination tier for the
LP2 policy variant. (a) UCLA graph, security 3rd.
(b) IXP-augmented graph, security 3rd. (c) UCLA
graph, security 2nd. (d) IXP-augmented graph, se-
curity 2nd.
it contains more peering edges, and therefore more short
peering routes.
2. While in Section 4.6 we found that most ASes that wish
to reach Tier 1 destinations are doomed, this is no longer
the case in the LP2 model; while the Tier 1 destinations
still do not have quite as many immune ASes as the Tier 2s
do, the vast majority of source ASes that wish to reach Tier
1 destinations are immune when security is 3rd.
What is the reason for this? Consider the security 2nd
model. Many of the protocol downgrades we saw with the
original LP model resulted from a source AS s preferring
(possibly-long) bogus customer path to the attacker m, over
(possibly-short) peer or provider routes to the legitimate
destination (e.g., Figure 2). However, in the LP2 policy
variant, s will only prefer a bogus customer path only if
s has no shorter (≤ 2 hop) peer or customer route to the
legitimate destinations; when s has such route, we consider
s to be immune (cf., Section 4.3.1). For example, while
AS 174 in Figure 2 was doomed in our original LP model
when security is 2nd, with the LP2 variant and security 2nd
AS 147 is now immune, because it has a one-hop peer route
to the legitimate Tier 1 destination!
Our results indicate that this situation is common. Com-
paring Figure 25 with Figure 4-5, suggests that during at-
tacks on Tier 1, 2, and CP destinations, there are many ASes
that have short (≤ 2 hop) peer routes to the legitimate des-
tination d, and are therefore choosing those routes instead
of long bogus customer routes to the attacker m. Moreover,
in the IXP-augmented graph, that are many more (≈ 4X)
peering edges than in the UCLA graph, which accounts for
the increased number of immune nodes we saw for the secu-
rity 2nd model in Figure 24.
While this is good news for the Tier 1s, we point out that
in the LP2 model this is little need for S*BGP to protect
the Tier 1, 2, 3 and CP destinations, since most source ASes
that wish to reach these destinations (i.e., > 80%) are happy
in the baseline scenario already!
